Topoi (collected papers)

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In this way Alexan- der tries to show that the fourfold division of the classes of predicates and, therefore, of dialectical problems is complete He gives different accounts of the on- tology underlying these cases, but he fundamentally emphasizes the systematic superi- ority of the negative definition Alexander starts with the differentia, which Aristotle explicitly discusses.

Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Aristotle says that the differentia is genike. I shall comment on this aspect be- low.

We can distinguish three main options. Interpretation 1 can always be applied to the occurrences of adjectives derived from the nouns indicating a kind of predicate with the addition of the ending -ikos, but is not very informative. Alexander oscillates between 2 and 3 in different cases. Alexander explains the sense in which the differentia is genike What distin- guishes the differentia from the genus is the fact that the genus of x expresses what x is, whereas the differentia expresses a sort of quality of x, by saying of what quality x is.

The reason for this is that the species, like the genus, is said of several things the species has a greater extension than its subject and is pred- icated in the what it is of the subject. Furthermore Alexander mentions the non-rigid use of eidos and genos. All intermediate results of the division of the categories are species of the genus they are divisions of and genera of their species.

The properties working as proprium at a certain time or as proprium with respect to some- thing are not propria without qualification of their subject, i.

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Rather, they are accidents of their subject, which happen to be predicated as proper- ties belonging to the subject only within a certain context. For this reason they have to be refuted or established as propria and not as accidents. Finally, as we shall see below, Alexander explains the additions to the problems on the accident by showing that the kind of predication involved answers to the features of accidental predication the predicate is not supposed to express the essence of the subject nor to convert with the subject.

If it is constitutive, it stands as it were in place of the genus […]. But if we use differentia now in place of the genus, now in place of the species, we cannot doubt that to raise a question about differentia is to ask about the genus. Some of these occurrences e. In this way problems whose predicate is a differ- entia or a species belong together with problems about the genus; problems whose predicate is an accident working as proprium pote or pros ti belong together with prob- lems concerning the proprium. But there are other problems whose addition cannot be dealt with in exactly the same way.

Alexander discusses four different cases, three of which are explicitly mentioned by Aristotle. I shall first consider two additions to prob- lems on definition and then two additions to problems on accident. Alexander But Aristotle also considers cases in which S is a linguistic formula and cases in which P is a simple expression an onoma.

Alexander makes clear what these cases are. S can be a linguistic formula in case there is no single noun to designate the subject of the propo- sition in question These cases are not problematic as long as the predicate is proposed as the definition of the object designated by S. In particular, the possibility that the subject be expressed through a complex linguistic formula does not pose a problem by itself.

But there are other cases, which Aristotle groups together with problems on defini- tion, in which what is at stake cannot be whether P is the definition i. These are cases in which P is a formula simply meant to elucidate the meaning of S or if S is a complex linguistic ex- pression of parts of S and cases in which P is a simple linguistic expression an onoma , introduced to clarify the name or the linguistic expression designating the subject of the proposition.

Alexander devotes relatively long comments to both cases and gives some examples. Nei- ther of these complex formulas is a definition, but the second linguistic formula is giv- en instead of the former linguistic formula for the sake of clarification These kinds of substitution belong together with problems on definition if they are meant as intermediate steps toward making what S is progressively clearer; the ideal end of this process should be the establishment of a definition.

It is not clear what Alexander thinks of the structure of the propositions introducing the substitution, namely it is not clear whether he thinks that they display a fundamen- tally predicative structure or that they express a relation of sameness see 2 below.

In the later tradition it becomes explicit that problems on definition include problems on definition strictly speaking, description i.

If this is the case, then all three cases could be regarded as cases of predicative problems on definition by enlarging the notion of definition to cover descriptions and explanations. Alexander follows Aristotle in saying that problems of sameness relate to definition because we can use the same methodos that we use for discussing a problem of sameness for discussing a problem concerning definition. This claim is understood in a rather precise way: if we manage to refute the claim that A and B are the same, then we also refute the claim that B is the definition of A.

But, if we manage to support the claim that A and B are the same, we do not therewith show that B is the definition of A and, for this reason, we cannot say that problems concerning sameness are the same as problems concerning definition First of all and in analogy with his general strategy in book i, Alexander emphasizes that the 1 In the commentary on Top. Von Arnim Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, vol.

On description see also Pamela Huby, Theophrastus of Eresus. Averroes, Paraphrasis Topicorum, in Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera, Venetia, apud. Boethius, dtd ii, AA, C. With respect to sameness in number, Alexander explains why sameness in number links to definition despite being conveyed also by a name and a proprium and a name and an accident: sameness in number indicates a relation not be- tween linguistic expressions which are different , but between what is signified by them.

The definition signifies the same as the name more properly and primarily than a proprium and, a fortiori, than an accident The reason for this al- teration of the Aristotelian classification is not given, but one possibility is that Theophrastus in line with other pieces of Aristotelian doctrine 2 regarded sameness as the opposite of difference, which as Aristotle seems to suggest has to be dealt with to- gether with problems concerning the genus.

In any case the position Alexander mentions seems to be distinguished from the view, explicitly supported by Aristotle Top. Alexander explains that non accidental properties do not belong to their subjects in different degrees; but comparative problems concern properties which can belong to their subject in different degrees. Problems concerning alternative courses of action problems concern- ing what one ought to do can also be regarded as comparative problems e.

Mantinus : Nec te lateat quo pacto respondeatur illis quatuor generibus. Idem enim numero annectitur seu accommodatur ipsi definitioni et his, quae cum ipsa numerantur, idem vero genere, et accidente, ac proportione, constat ipsa annecti his capitibus. Aristotle seems to distinguish primary and secondary substances and says that one could ask whether form is more of a substance than matter. The reason why Alexander rejects this account is that, in asking whether something has to be chosen or not, one simply asks about the simple belonging of a property whether something is better than something else , not about the belonging of a property as a genus.

Simple belonging is characteristic of the acci- dent and, therefore, these problems should be labeled as problems concerning the ac- cident.

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It is not clear whom Alexander has in mind, but, as in the afore-mentioned case of the classification of problems of sameness, these remarks too testify to the existence of some debate on the classification of dialectical problems. Alexander mentions the position of some who claim that these are problems concerning the genus, in which what is asked is whether the subject falls under the genus being on.

Does this represent a threat for that partition and, more generally, for the possibility of an exhaustive treatment of dialectic? According to Alexander this is not the case.

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In An. The two latter questions bear an analogous relation to the two corresponding former questions in marking a shift from the establishment that something is the case to the enquiry into the causes or grounds of the established state of affairs. Given that this fourfold partition is given by Aristotle as a very general and exhaustive division of the kinds of problem we can enquire into, one preliminary question concerning the partition of problems we find in the Topics is how the two par- titions of problems relate to each other. All dialectical problems can be led back to only two of the four kinds of problem distinguished in An.

In this chapter Aristotle says that it is possible to produce a syllogismos of a definition, in contrast with the claim argued for in An. It is possible to produce a syllogism on whether what has been proposed as a definition of something responds to certain formal criteria for being a definition — and this will be a syllogism on whether something is the case. Having delimited the domain of dialectical problems and having explained how they all fall within the fourfold partition corresponding to the four kinds of predicate, Alexander deals with a further problem.

Aristotle himself says that in a certain sense all types of dialectical problems are horika, i. Nonetheless — Aristotle says — this situation should not lead one to formulate a unified methodos of all dialectical problems as if they were all problems on definition. Macrostructure of Top. Themistius, In an. Depending on the way in which this claim is understood, the project of formu- lating a unified methodos for all dialectical problems is either impossible to realize or dif- ficult to accomplish and leading to an obscure formulation, which could hardly be of practical use In other words, we can refute anaskeuazein a definition by showing that it does not belong to the subject, that it does not convert with the subject or that the ap- propriate genus or differentia of the subject has not been given.

We can achieve these three results by resorting to the means we would use to refute anaskeuazein a propo- sition about accident, proprium or genus or differentia respectively Accord- ing to this reading, which is the one Alexander prefers, all problems are horika exactly in the same sense in which problems of sameness are such i. Alexander shows with two arguments why this is the case. First, it is possible to argue in support of the thesis concerning another predicate without ar- guing in support of a corresponding thesis concerning a definition as well as it is possi- ble to refute a thesis on another predicate without refuting the corresponding thesis about the definition.

For example, one can establish the thesis that P belongs to S by showing that P can belong or not belong to S; P belongs to S as an accident; but if this thesis is established, not only is the thesis that P is the definition of S not established, but it is refuted.

Similarly, the thesis that P is an accident of S can be refuted by showing that P is a proprium of S; but in this way the claim that P is the definition of S is not re- futed together with the thesis that P is an accident of S; rather, the thesis that P is the definition of S receives support from the established thesis that P is a proprium of S. We can refute the thesis that P is the genus of S by showing that P is in the substance of S and is convertible with S; in this way, the thesis on the genus is refuted, but the corre- sponding thesis that P is the definition of S is established.

Or we can refute the thesis that P is a proprium of S by showing that P belongs in the substance of S; this refutation of P as a proprium establishes P as a definition. All these cases show that there is no biunivocal correspondence between establishing or refuting theses on the other kinds of predicate and establishing and refuting theses on definition. As for the prologues, those to ii-iv are much more elaborate than those to v-vii and include partly different explanations of the order of ii-vii. This shows that a complete and unified methodos of dialectical problems according to this under- standing is impossible to achieve.

An alternative, more plausible but still non-recommendable reading of the claim that all dialectical problems are horika is the following The mutual relevance of the mothodoi about the other types of predicate and the methodos about the definition should be spelled out by distinguishing different cases: some strategies to refute the ac- cident also refute the definition, whereas some strategies to refute the accident support the definition; similarly for all other types of predicate.

Alexander seems to think that in this way it would be possible to cover all the materials which a complete dialectical treatment should include, but the result would be unclear and hard to use Collecting topoi on the basis of the division of the kinds of predicate allows clarity and completeness. Nonetheless, it is true that there are topoi which are relevant for more than one kind of dialectical problem.

Aristotle starts with the topoi on the accident because the accident is the most general and the simplest of all kinds of predicate Generality explains priority: Aristotle presents as idioi of the accident the topoi for establishing and refuting theses on whether P belongs or does not belong to S Any kind of predicate stands in a relation of belonging to its subject , By showing that a predicate P does not belong to a subject S, i.

Alexan- der here resorts to the vocabulary that Aristotle uses to express natural priority cf. Starting from the accident does not only reflect a sort of natural order within kinds of predicate, but also allows Aristotle to lay out a well ordered and articulated exposition of topoi: had he started from topoi on definition, Aristotle would have had to include among them topoi about the other kinds of predicate, whereas in this way he can spell out the topoi pertaining to each kind of predicate separately Considerations of generality and expediency rule, according to Alexander, the overall structure of Top.

Aristotle starts with topoi for refuting or supporting universal theses, because refuting or supporting universal theses can be used to indirectly refute or support particular theses. Furthermore, given that in the most common dialectical situation the questioner has to refute a thesis, he starts with universal topoi useful for refutation — and, correspondingly, closes the books on the accident with topoi for tack- ling particular thesis Top. After the accident, the genus is the most general kind of predicate The generality of the genus, though, is not spelled out in the same way as the generality of the accident.

The acci- dent is general in the sense that the accident is established or refuted by establishing of refuting that the predicate belongs to the subject and some form of belonging is char- acteristic of any kind of predicate. But the genus belongs to the subject in a qualified way The same qualification applies to the differentia Generality here is a matter of relative extension of subject and predicate in the different kinds of predication.

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