Intervention of the Other

Humanitarian intervention

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Those intervening militarily are one or more states, or international organizations. The need to consider and understand the many issues involved in humanitarian interventions have been borne home by the fact that these interventions has become more complex and more common since the s, and because of the consequences of non-intervention, such as in the Rwandan genocide of , in which nearly one million people were killed in less than three months.

Humanitarian interventions raise many complex, inter-related issues of international law, international relations, political philosophy, and ethics. This article considers moral issues of whether or when humanitarian intervention is justified, using just war theory as a framework. Section One addresses general characterizations of humanitarian interventions and commonly discussed cases, as well as some definitional or terminological issues. Section Two examines the question: What humanitarian emergencies rise to a level at which intervention is appropriate? Section Three presents just war theory as a common framework for justifying humanitarian interventions.

Section Four considers some other, related issues that may support or challenge armed interventions: international law, state sovereignty, the selectivity problem, political realism, post-colonialist and feminist critiques, and pacifism. But cases of armed interventions are not new. Several times during the nineteenth century European powers intervened militarily in various provinces of the Ottoman Empire to protect Christian enclaves from massacre or oppression Bass.

Later cases include uses of military force to protect Iraqi Kurds, and interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, among many others. The genocide in Rwanda focused attention on the consequences of failing to intgervening, because external military force was not deployed to prevent the killing of nearly 1 million people in just three months of violence. Philosophic attention to humanitarian interventions is not new.

The seventeenth century jurist, Hugo Grotius, is credited with originating the modern conception of armed humanitarian intervention. If a tyrant … practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connection is not cut off in such a case ….

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It would not follow that others may not take up arms for them. Classic theorists like St.

In the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill appealed to the importance of communal self-determination in providing consequentialist arguments limiting armed interventions. Consider this paradigm characterization of humanitarian interventions as:. Holzgrefe, A humanitarian intervention does not require the consent of the target state: it is a form of coercion. The government is deemed culpable in the suffering of others that is to be prevented or ended. The purpose is not conquest, territorial control, support of insurrectionist or secessionist movements, regime change, or constitutional change of government.

Humanitarian intervention vary in terms of motivations of a state in using military force. Other definitions attend more to the effects of intervening than to motivations. These definitional disputes involve evaluating actions on behalf of others. The issue, then, may be more a matter of how much normative work is to be done by definition rather than by a separable ethical judgment of the actions themselves. Indeed, these semantic concerns are grounded ultimately in re-conceiving state sovereignty not as a right not to be transgressed by outsiders, but as a duty to protect the people of a state and, if needed, people of other states sec.

Many differences of definition about what constitutes a humanitarian intervention reflect varying views about the normative merits and justifications for using force to address the suffering of others at the hands of their own government. Even proponents of humanitarian intervention advocate very limited circumstances where such uses of military force are justifiable. In particular, proponents attempt to specify minimum, threshold conditions in terms of the severity, scale, and kinds of human suffering necessary but not sufficient to justify intervention.

Common among specifications of threshold conditions are requirements that the most basic of human rights are being violated, that the human suffering is widespread and systematic, and that the government bears some culpability for what is happening to its people.

Interventions, then, are justifiable only to address the most egregious violations; the threshold conditions in the target state must be those that, as Walzer put it, "shock the conscience of mankind. Specifications of threshold conditions raise several issues. A specification of the conditions of suffering will be inherently vague.

How many rights violations or how many horrors or how extraordinary must the violations be in order to satisfy the threshold condition for armed intervention?

Western NGO's: intervention in other way

A second issue involves the invoked notion of basic human rights. Attention to violations of basic human rights, however, presupposes a hierarchy of such rights for all humans. International human rights law introduces yet other hierarchies which may be relevant. Government culpability must satisfy certain threshold conditions.

Or government may be complicit, indirectly fostering human rights violations by providing funding, arms, or logistical support to private militias, by coordinating attacks on people through control of the communication infrastructure, or by inciting action through propaganda and other forms of media control. This was the case in the Rwandan genocide of and during the violent campaigns by the janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan, beginning about Or state involvement may be more akin to negligence, incompetence, or inability to govern.

In inept or failed states, the government does not maintain effective control of territory and people. In much of the country, people lived in fear of armed militias while the central government could not assert effective control.

The United States intervened militarily. The government culpability necessary to satisfy threshold conditions can range from perpetrator to failed state. Furthermore, situations often mask or complicate whether threshold conditions are satisfied. Widespread and systemic human suffering often occurs amidst or accompanying domestic insurrections, counter-insurgency campaigns, revolutions, liberation efforts, partition or secession battles, or civil wars, for example.

In Darfur, the government of the Sudan claims to have been conducting a counter-insurgency campaign; the Bosnian War can be seen as part of a secession or partition battle; the Rwandan genocide occurred in the context of a civil war and struggle for power in the country. The challenges here are both epistemic and conceptual. Satisfying threshold conditions of suffering may depend on the specific domestic contexts in which people and government find themselves.

Though most discussions of humanitarian interventions specify threshold conditions in terms of human rights violations, other kinds of characterizations of the relevant human suffering are used by others. There are justificatory implications for these kinds of differences. A characterization in terms of human rights readily suggests deontological justifications for armed interventions.

For any genuine right, others are bound by correlative duties.

When It's Used

Thus, armed interventions are justified partially as discharging default duties correlated with the human rights that are being violated in the target state. On the other hand, some see armed interventions as aimed at reducing human suffering, regardless of whether there are violations of specific human rights. Some feminists have argued that social oppression of women constitutes threshold conditions for forceful interventions Cudd.

Uses of armed force, of course, have costs for human suffering, too. The idea is that sometimes the use of deadly force is justifiable to save lives and reduce total human suffering. Another development relevant to interventions is the concept of human security. The concept of human security is defined broadly both in terms of causes and kinds of human suffering. The United Nations Development Program has adopted a similarly broad definition.

With respect to threshold conditions for humanitarian interventions, using the broad concept of human security has some advantages.

Determining whether threshold conditions are satisfied is also simpler without the need to apply specific legal or moral categories such as basic human rights or genocide. Furthermore, it is argued, the concept calls attention to preventing humanitarian emergencies from emerging, instead of focusing so much on armed interventions as reactions to emergencies. But the breadth and scope of the concept also is challenging for use as a threshold condition for humanitarian interventions.

Virtually any kind of widespread, systematic suffering or threat to people becomes a security issue possibly addressed by an armed intervention: many situations around the world thereby satisfy a requisite condition for justifiable intervention. For these and other reasons, the concept of human security is not often invoked in articulating threshold conditions for interventions.

intervention

The satisfaction of specified threshold conditions and state culpability requirements are only necessary conditions for morally justifying humanitarian interventions. There is a paradoxical quality in using deadly force to prevent or end violence against others.

Intervention | Definition of Intervention by Merriam-Webster

How can it be that war is warranted in the name of saving lives? As matter of morality and legality, individuals have rights of defense that permit using deadly force as proportionate response to unavoidable, imminent threats to our own lives or to the lives of others, whether the endangered people are kin, akin, or strangers. By analogy, then, states have not only rights of self-defense if attacked, but rights to use deadly force in defense of others.

A second analogy also sees states as persons. More direct arguments see a connection between taking universal human rights seriously and acting rightly with deadly force when this force is necessary to defend or protect those rights. Direct consequentialist arguments appeal to the morality of preventing extraordinary suffering when possible, that is, if and when there is opportunity and capability that is not more costly in its effects on human lives than not acting with deadly force.

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