The main problem here is that although Wendt knows the emergentist position very well for his purpose-driven reading, see especially chapter 13 of the book , his quantum-thesis draws him to stressing the independence of individuals:. In the light of archaeological and historical evidence, however, it is evident that conscious individuals have become possible through the evolvement of the emergent layer of society. Although analogies to the quantum world may in some ways be illuminating, there is no point in conflating these two levels of reality that are so wide apart; thus we should avoid doing so.
Animals can learn and reason to a degree. It is even possible to have a capacity to formulate full sentences without being conscious, as humans did some 3,, years ago. The cultural-evolutionary process that has led to the development of metaphorical language and complex society is not so much quantum-like as historical, hermeneutical and dialectical: parts and whole interact and evolve side by side in the meaningful world of actions and structures. Language, which is a constantly changing, relational, multi-layered and multifarious system of meanings; and the evolving differentiation and complexity of social organization; are mutually enabling.
Inscribing laws on stone for all to see and follow from c. Moreover, it is also easy to show that social wholes have properties that are not reducible to their parts, independently of whether their parts are historically constituted or not. It may be difficult for us to grasp our existential and causal dependence on social wholes and processes, because as observers of socio-historical developments we are enfolded within them the same holds true for our dependence on biological and physical processes.
Moreover, our enabled and enfolded understandings are shaped by power and interests and affected by various social and cultural influences, themselves constituted within the geo-historical fields of the social. Ontological atomism is an illusion that can constitute and legitimise particular geo-historical practices and institutions. Although indvidualism is an illusion, individuals are not. Emergent layers such as conscious experience, agency, will and intentions, as well as various social structures and wholes, are all real and causally efficacious.
Moreover, to characterise ontological and ideological individualism as an illusion implies nothing about the value of socially constituted but singular individuals, who have the right to have rights. Another partial analogy to the quantum world is that no pure observation of the social world, thus constituted, is possible. Particles or wave-functions do not evaluate or criticise; whereas we humans as complex, conscious and knowledgeable actors do.
Rovelli talks about the end of infinity. Cosmos is vast, but finite. The end of infinity implies fundamental criticism of approaches such as string theory that presuppose movements in a continuum.
But what is especially noteworthy is that ignorance tends to lead to mystification. Not only do we have uncomplicated and well-structured versions of QT that make this kind of mystification quite unnecessary. It is also the case that analogous ontological and epistemological conceptions have been known to a large number of philosophers and social scientists for centuries. Hermeneutico-dialectical approaches to philosophy and social sciences have explored themes now associated with quantum mechanics at least since the 18th century, such as subject-object and part-whole relationships and the relational and processual nature of reality.
There is no reason to deny the reality of time, space and causation this denial does not follow from QT , although our conceptions of them can and do change. Attempts to theorise society in quantum terms is largely a category mistake, although quantum-like features can occur also at larger scales and although analogies between the two can sometimes be illuminating. Instead of multiplying the universe by zillions; denying the reality of time, space and causation; or mystifying quanta and rocks as conscious beings; I would like to propose a rather different claim: better understandings of history and social dynamics could contribute to scientific developments.
Moreover, as Wendt insists, adequate interpretations and further development of theoretical physics and cosmology require critical distance-taking from the dominant Western metaphysics. For instance, we can now see that there is a sense in which Aristotle was right after all: causation can be also formal or formative and final, rather than just efficient and material, while these categories now assume new, post-Aristotelian meanings.
The degree of our freedom can be increased by replacing particular unnecessary, unwanted and often misrepresented causal sources of determination with more wanted, needed and more clearly understood sources of causal determination, increasing our autonomy as self-determination. Contra Wendt, freedom is not something that is inscribed in the probabilism of the wave-function.
Frankly, I have difficulties in understanding how random probabilistic events could mean freedom. Rather, freedom is a contingent ethico-political project that only holo reflexive actors such as we can carry on. Just one final remark.
While I do not find the idea of panpsychism particularly plausible, there is nonetheless a sense in which consciousness seems imprinted in the fine texture of cosmos. We are part of the whole of cosmos, not observers separate from it. From this perspective, what the emergence of consciousness means is that the creative cosmos is becoming conscious of itself — and not necessarily only on our planet Earth. In this, neither M the amount of money nor V the velocity of money is in practice measurable, and both P price level and T amount of transactions involve uncertainties.
In spite of these and other differences — Nils Bohr was also interested in Buddhism, pragmatism and other strands of thought — the instrumentalism of the Copenhagen interpretation of QT and F-twist share the idea that neither truth nor meaning really matters. What matters is whether a theory works in the sense of implying predictions, making it possible to manipulate reality for some technical, pragmatic or ideological purpose. In accordance with many variations of liberalism, it is also assumed that these ends are in some sense arbitrary or subjective; it is not the task of science to say anything about them.
Friedman: Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. Reflections on the Milton Friedman Legacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Indeed, for me, much of quantum theory becomes much clearer and less mystical. Many of the paradoxes like schizophrenic cats, the watchdog effect, delayed choice effects, etc.
In fact the more 1 explored the Bohm model, the more I was puzzled as to why people have turned it into an ideological battle. These structures involve an important role for active information and formal causality, and these seem to connect matter and mind through an analogy. But Bohm is saying nothing about panpsychism in this paper or elsewhere, as far as I know.
As a species homo sapiens emerged in Africa at least , years ago.
For most of its existence, homo sapiens has lived similarly to its hominid predecessors and contemporaries. There is no evidence of the effects of complex language and society — certainly no traces of history, religion, arts, architecture, science, or philosophy — before the first cave paintings appeared some 30,, years ago. The development of language was very slow compared to cultural-historical scales of time but started, step by step, to accelerate. Each new stage of linguistic learning created new perceptions and attentions, resulting in important cultural changes, which are reflected in the available archaeological record.
The first phase is the establishment of clearly recognisable intentional calls. And what is more, this stage of speech had to remain for a long period until such modifiers became stable. This slow development was also necessary so that the basic repertoire of the call system was kept intact to perform its intentional functions. This age of modifiers perhaps lasted up to 40, B. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, quotation from pp. I do not find it counterintuitive at all. It is entirely plausible to say that all life forms categorize and distinguish between what is good and bad for their reproduction, that all animals can process information and feel effects, and that some animals can also reason and learn, without imputing consciousness to them.
Wendt also dramatizes the leap from non-consciousness stones to consciousness reflective humans. It is the whole of all these evolutionary layers that constitute our humanness and the feel of our consciousness. Jaynes, Origin , op. For Jaynes, consciousness is an operation, which functions by way of analogy. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 33 : pp. Both in science and everyday life, the microlevel of individual units is often inadequate for explaining phenomena, and we therefore must construct upper-level explanations.
For one, any whole that is constrained by some collective principle is different from the mere sum of its parts and have effects on those parts e.
Another related phenomenon stems from the composition of the whole. For example, many famous paradoxes of Keynesian economics arise from a simple fallacy of composition, such as the paradox of thrift: if most individuals and firms tried to save in the same way at the same time, aggregate demand would dwindle, harming incomes and profits. Gluts and unemployment result, and whatever savings have accumulated may soon become depleted. There can also be contradictions between principles of organization of social wholes. For instance, when in capitalist market economy individuals occupy relational positions that pre-existed their entrance to the system, the distribution of various goods and entitlements depends to a large degree on relations of power between these positions, not only on the characteristics of the individuals.
In physics, for instance, there are four fundamental kinds of interactions electromagnetic, weak, strong, gravitational which serve to explain the correlations that are observed in physical systems. As regards the mind-matter problem, the situation is more difficult. Far from a theoretical understanding in this field, the existing body of knowledge essentially consists of empirical correlations between material and mental states. These correlations are descriptive, not explanatory; they are not causally conditioned.
It is for some purposes interesting to know that particular brain areas are activated during particular mental activities; but this does, of course, not explain why they are. Thus, it would be premature to talk about mind-matter interactions in the sense of causal relations. For the sake of terminological clarity, the neutral notion of relations between mind and matter will be used in this article.
In many approaches used to discuss relations between material [ma] brain states and mental [me] states of consciousness, these relations are conceived in a direct way A :. This provides a minimal framework to study reduction, supervenience, or emergence relations Kim ; Stephan which can yield both monistic and dualistic pictures.
For instance, there is the classical stance of strong reduction , claiming that all mental states and properties can be reduced to the material domain materialism or even to physics physicalism.
More or less, this leads to a monistic picture, in which any need to discuss mental states is eliminated right away or at least considered as epiphenomenal. While mind-brain correlations are still legitimate though causally inefficacious from an epiphenomenalist point of view, eliminative materialism renders even correlations irrelevant. Another, less discussed counterargument is that the physical domain itself is not causally closed.
Any solution of fundamental equations of motion be it experimentally, numerically, or analytically requires to fix boundary conditions and initial conditions which are not given by the fundamental laws of nature Primas This causal gap applies to classical physics as well as quantum physics, where a basic indeterminacy due to collapse make it even more challenging. A third class of counterarguments refer to the difficulties to include notions of temporal present and nowness in a physical description Franck , However, direct relations between mental and material states can also be conceived in a non-reductive fashion.
A number of variants of emergence Stephan are prominent examples.
Within a dualistic scheme of thinking, it becomes almost inevitable to discuss the question of causal influence between mental and material states. As an alternative to A , it is possible to conceive mind-matter relations indirectly B , via a third category:. This third category, here denoted [mame], is often regarded as being neutral with respect to the distinction between [ma] and [me], i. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
Early versions go back as far as Spinoza. In the early days of psychophysics in the 19th century, Fechner and Wundt advocated related views.