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This is the revised second edition of our book with the same title, which presents a rather comprehensive treatment of static and dynamic. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural.
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Later Edition. Date: July 30, This is mainly because people do not fully reason through the game in a fully logically consistent fashion. Date: July 14, This stochastic game problem, in which one player stochastic uncertainty maximizes the tracking error and another player control input minimizes the tracking error, could be equivalent to a robust minimax tracking problem. About the Editor Tamer Basar is a prolific scientist and author who has published more than journal articles, books and book chapters, and numerous conference publications in the general areas of optimal, robust, and adaptive control, large-scale and decentralized systems and control, dynamic games, stochastic processes and control, estimation and information theory, and mathematical economics. Game Theory Based Network Security.
Editors: Bas? Imprint: Academic Press. Published Date: 28th January Page Count: View all volumes in this series: Mathematics in Science and Engineering. Flexible - Read on multiple operating systems and devices.
Easily read eBooks on smart phones, computers, or any eBook readers, including Kindle. Store Locations. Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance makes this classic text a necessity once again.
The first edition was fully revised in , adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Bash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition.
Topics covered include: static and dynamic noncooperative game theory; with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationships between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.