Narrative Logic:A Semantic Analysis of the Historians Language (Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library)

The Irish Sí Tradition: Connections Between the Disciplines, and What’s in a Word?

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This question is closely related to the needs of critical hagiography as well. Dolezel formulates it with the means of Kripke's notion of "rigid designator" that Kripke himself relates to proper names p. Kripke, Naming and Necessit y , Cambridge, Mass. Thus, for example, rigid designator "Napoleon" designates at the same time historic Napoleon, Napoleon of "War and Peace" and, say, Napoleon from the play by German expressionist Georg Kayser where Napoleon manages to escape from the island of St. Helena and proceed with his career in New Orleans. In the traditional "one-world" literary criticism scrutinizing literary works featuring characters from the real history is fraught with essential difficulties.

Assuming that fictional characters act along with historic ones such literary criticism cannot keep any notion of homogeneity of literary work. This may mean, for instance, that different sorts of semantics are requested for Napoleon and Pierre Bezukhov. Dolezel's position in this sense is very strong, since for him Napoleon of the "War and Peace" and Pierre Bezukhov are just characters referring to one of the possible worlds of fictional narrative. Dolezel therefore formulates the principle of ontological homogeneity of the possible world of fictional narrative. He considers this principle fundamental and it appears still more fundamental for us.

However, Dolezel's approach meets its own difficulties, none easier than those arising before the "one-world" literary criticism. Dolezel has to assert that "Tolstoy's Napoleon is no les fictional than his Pierre Bezukhov".

Dolezel couldn't say otherwise since he decided to proceed from the absolutely fictional nature of the possible worlds of fictional works. Since the principle of ontological homogeneity takes effect, all the characters of the fictional work should be equally fictional.

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But here inner logic of Dolezel's reasoning makes him contradict the facts both well-known and obvious: Tolstoy wrote his novel as a kind of historiosophical research or, more precisely, a certain mental experiment in the field of history. The author of "War and Peace" himself pursued the same goals as does historian at his professional work: although instead of academic methods he chose what we have just called a mental experiment.

In particular, Tolstoy tried to restore, though with the specific means of literary fiction, exactly an image of historic Napoleon. Actually, we have no slightest reason to reckon at least, a priori that Tolstoy managed to cope with this goal less successfully than, for instance, the author of historical monograph about Napoleon, E. Tarle: whom nobody, however, would blame for fiction, - at least, for literary fiction. If Dolezel thinks that restoration of the historic image of Napoleon in "War and Peace" can by no means be as reliable as the analogous by goals work by Tarle, he should be expected to prove it.

In particular, it would be necessary to argue why author's subjective intentions his claim to build up historiosophical research in the form of a novel could bring to nothing but creation of the next literary fiction. However, Dolezel not only gives up such explanation but sinks into still deepening contradiction to his own principles.

He has to carry the restriction of principle of ontological homogeneity in regard to fictional works further on. Running a bit forward, we'll say again that for us, contrary to Dolezel, the principle of ontological homogeneity will remain intact. And in particular, as it regards rigid designators, we will insist on the solution that attributes the certain, non-one and non-zero at a time, "measure of reality" see below to Tolstoy's Napoleon, Tarle's Napoleon and Pierre Bezukhov at once.

As for Tarle's Napoleon, it should be clear, after all that was said above about historic narrative, that, for all the respect to historian's labor this Napoleon narrative substance "Napoleon" should not be mixed with Napoleon of historic reality. However, in regard to Tolstoy's Napoleon, it should be noted that, for all the possible disagreement with author's historiosophical views this Napoleon cannot be ultimately denied historic reliability.

At last, in regard to Pierre Bezukhov, the question concerning his ontological status is most interesting, and we will deal with it later on. The problem of historic characters in the fictional work is like a hatch, not very large by the sight of it but hiding an abyss behind it: an abyss of quite real and even physical reality that no fictional world could contain. At the first glance, there exists a ready solution of this problem which Dolezel actually tries to use p. It has been developed yet within the frame of classical, "one-world" literary criticism.

The unquestionable fact that fictional work can contain explicit statements about the real world is reduced by Dolezel to what Boris M. Eichenbaum whom he quotes called "theoretical digressions" in the monograph "Young Tolstoy", Already at this point one question arises: why can authors of fictional works who construct, according to Dolezel, absolutely fictional worlds of their own fiction manage these "theoretical digressions" referring to our real world?

How is such procedure logically possible? Representatives of the "old" literary criticism didn't have to face this problem or rather it hasn't been too acute. After all, in the "one-world" model everything refers to our "actual" world in this of other way, fictional images and non-fictional reasoning alike.

John Searl, whose article Dolezel quotes p. Following the "one-world" notion of fictional literature and unconcerned with the principle of ontological homogeneity of the world of fictional work since he admits no particular world of fictional work , Searl can easily afford differentiating between fictional and non-fictional fragments inside the fictional work.

Even so he encounters no logical contradictions:. Let's consider the most well-known example: Tolstoy begins "Anna Karenina" with a sentence: "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way". This, I think, is a statement made in earnest and not based on fiction. This is a true assertion. It is an integral part of the novel but it takes no part in the fictional narration.

When Nabokov opens "Ada" with an intentionally wrong quote from Tolstoy, saying: "All happy families are more or less dissimilar, all unhappy ones more or less alike", he contradicts Tolstoy by implication and chaffs him as well.

The Irish Sí Tradition: Connections Between the Disciplines, and What’s in a Word? | SpringerLink

Both statements are true assertions, even if Nabokov's statement was made in the way of ironically quoting Tolstoy. Such examples compel us to make the last differentiation: between fictional work and fictional discourse. Fictional work doesn't necessarily consists entirely and usually doesn't consist entirely of the fictional based on fiction discourse".

Searl also couldn't escape the difficulty of explaining why proceeding from or, at least, in connection with the discourse that is "based on fiction" it's possible to make "true statements". Yet this is a common problem of the "one-world" semantics of fictional narrative.

In Dolezel's case this problem is not only being solved but also worsened: he still needs different semantics for different parts of fictional work in order to analyze it, and yet no logical formulas are suggested to ensure their interrelation. Still worse, Dolezel's poetics is being threatened by the more problematic question of the "firmness" of fictional work, that is, a question of firm basis for integrity of a building made of materials so heterogeneous and fastened in a fashion so obscure if fastened at all. However, detailed scrutiny shows that the very Dolezel's observation, regarding ontological heterogeneity of the world of literary fiction and the world of "theoretical digressions", isn't in line with the facts.

Traditional literary criticism from Eichenbaum to Searl did not consider question of distinct separation between fictional and non-fictional discourse within the fictional work crucial let's recall that both discourses were considered related, though in different ways, to our single "actual" reality. However, for Dolezel it's a question of defining boundaries of the fictional world of a fictional work within this very fictional work.

The absence of a distinct separation between "true assertions" and fiction may prove fatal for the philosophy that places nothing between "actual" and "fantastic". Let's consider it in detail, remembering what we've already said concerning the fallacy of differentiation between I-texts and C-texts suggested by Dolezel. Dolezel, in accordance with his notion of "I-texts", introduces for Eichenbaum's "theoretical digressions" the notion of "I-digressions" p. In the cases that he considers the boundaries of such digressions are quite evident, though at times these digressions take too much place and even start living their own life.

Thus, Dolezel examines aesthetical essay written on behalf of the main character of Huysmans' "A Rebours" to which Remy de Gourmont refers as a work by this fictional character and not by Huysmans himself as a closest analogy within the margins of Russian literature, the treatise on Chernyshevsky written on behalf of the main character of Nabokov's "The Gift" may be referred to. Whereas the first half of Dolezel's thesis doesn't raise doubts of course, these "digressions" are but means to judge affairs of namely the actual world , its second half where "digressions" are opposed by this feature to the fictional text as such is rather vulnerable to criticism.

We won't discuss in detail the question how can reasoning about the world so alien according to Dolezel to fictional work as our actual world find room within the limits of the fictional work without finally damaging and destroying it. Let's consider other difficulties that are not few. Is a boundary between "digressions" and fictional texts as such always as evident as in the case of Guysmans and Nabokov? There is no doubt that these articles include for the most part the thoughts on Russian literature that are dear to Bitov himself.

However, the context of the novel shows that the main character's views on Russian literature, and of course on this life at large, aren't identical to those of the author at all; moreover, the author maintains critical view on his character as well. It's obvious that were these articles written not on behalf of "Levushka" but of Andrej Bitov, they would be quite different.

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Where is the boundary between I and C here? It turns out that we have to speak of fictive I-digressions, so that we arrive at the contradictio in adjecto. Fictive nature of I-digressions in the modern literature can be even more evident, as shown by the instance of Milorad Pavic's Dictionary of the Khazars which is constructed as essentially faithful, though supplied with modern additions, restoration of the scientific work that never existed in reality, Dictionary of the Khazars Lexicon Cosri , allegedly published in in Latin by the learned man Daubmannus and destroyed in Judging by its content, this restoration indeed contains scientific data and appears, to the extent of author's scientific erudition, to be rather adequate introduction to the study of Khazars.

The possibility of reading Pavich as educational literature is, maybe, not the most optimal solution, yet it scarcely raises any doubts even within the scientific community. If these are "digressions", what do they digress from? After all, if we leave out everything but the correspondence of fictional characters, then all the plot ties in the text will be lost. It's worth to mention that in the novels of Huysmans and Nabokov, and even of Bitov scientific works of their characters are set apart from the development of the plot.

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