The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger

The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger
Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger book. Happy reading The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger Pocket Guide.

You need JavaScript enabled to view it. Phenomenology, Brentano, Husserl, description, theory of definition, intentionality. Petersburg State University St. Petersburg, Russia e-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. Fundamental Ontology, Martin Heidegger, being, time, Dasein, temporality, ecstasis. The hermeneutical conception of personal identity and self-understanding is based on narrativity. Narrative, self, self-understanding, self-consciousness, hermeneutic circle, embodiment.

Petersburg State Polytechnic University e-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. The article is devoted to phenomenological theory of spatial constituting in the philosophy of E. Corporeality, corporeal consciousness, kinestezy, appresentation, apperception, spatial syntheses of consciousness.

See a Problem?

Living present, transcendental being, transcendental life, time-consciousness, phenomenological method, reflection. Petersburg State University e-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. Transcendental Ego, non-egological sensuality, phenomenological abstraction, reflective intuition. The author of this monograph considers substantial sides of philosophical work of Heidegger in its own phenomenological context. Principles of phenomenology, meaning of being, fundamental ontology, ontological funding of sciences.

Passive constitution, formation of sense, creation, corporeality, phenomenological introspection, foundation.

Recommended for you

The breadth of M. Max Scheler, phenomenology, pragmatism, theory of values, obviousness, religious action, individual experience, temporality. French phenomenology, post-phenomenology, A. Formation of self-consciousness, internal structure of subjectivity, phenomenological method, internal consciousness of time. Corporal experience, consciousness, cognition, self, corporal image, corporal scheme, prenoetic structures.

My Wishlist Sign In Join. Be the first to write a review. Add to Wishlist. Ships in 15 business days. Link Either by signing into your account or linking your membership details before your order is placed. Description Table of Contents Product Details Click on the cover image above to read some pages of this book! Key to some References Cited in the Text.

Some Useful Definitions

Non-being and Time. Time as Number and Calculating Soul. Ontology of Human Action. Searching for the Lost Subject. Primordial Temporality and Ontological Difference. Index of Names. Subject Index. In Stock. The living-present marks the essence of all manifestation, for in its automatic or passive self-givenness the living-present makes possible the apprehension of the elapsed phases of the life of consciousness and thereby the elapsed moments of the transcendent spatio-temporal object of which the conscious self is aware.

As an absolute flowing identity in a manifold—of primal impression, retention and protention—the stream of conscious life in the living-present constitutes the procession of words in the sentence that appears and is experienced sequentially in accordance with the temporally distinct position of each word. That I hear the words of the fifty-minute lecture and feel myself inspired or bored is possible only on the basis of my self-awareness or consciousness of internal time. That the living-present temporalizes means that it grasps its past and future as absent without reducing its past and future to the present, thus freezing consciousness temporal flow.

As Husserl himself admits that we have no words for this time-constituting phenomenon, the image of shimmering seems a more appropriate descriptor, for Husserl understand the living-present paradoxically as a standing-streaming PCIT No. Husserl must characterize the flow as non-temporal.

Bestselling Series

Although worlds networks of involvements, what Heidegger sometimes calls Reality are culturally relative phenomena, Heidegger occasionally seems to suggest that nature, as it is in itself , is not. Heidegger unifies the duality of modern philosophy. What do I think? Sep 10, Pete rated it it was amazing. Afterthe fundamental works ofE. Unfortunately, this cannot be read by a novice. As Dasein, I ineluctably find myself in a world that matters to me in some way or another.

If that which makes possible the awareness of a unity in succession itself occurred in succession, then we would need to account for the apprehension of the succession unique to the living-present, and so on and so forth, ad infnitum PCIT , No. An infinite regress of consciousness, however, would mean that we never would achieve an answer to the question of what makes possible the consciousness of time.

This argument in favor of the non-temporal character of the living-present brings us to the two senses in which the special form of intentional consciousness is an absolute consciousness. First, Husserl characterizes the living-present as absolute because a non-temporal consciousness that needs no other consciousness behind it to account for its self-apprehension is just that, absolute, the bottom line.

If philosophy construes all awareness according to an object-intentionality model of awareness, i. For example, when I am writing this entry, I am conscious of the computer on which I am typing, as well as myself as the one typing.

Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’

To explain, philosophically, however, how I apprehend myself as the one typing, the dyadic object-intentionality model of awareness will not suffice. Locke establishes this account by distinguishing i simple ideas of sense directed toward iia objects from i simple ideas of reflection directed toward iib the self. In both cases, i knows iia and iib in the same manner insofar as i takes iia and iib as objects while i itself goes unnoticed or unaccounted for.

Even if a simple idea of reflection directs itself toward the self, one self the reflecting self remains subject while the other self the reflected self becomes the object. In self-awareness, however, no difference, distance or separation exists between the knower and the known. Forced to apprehend itself as an object in an exercise of simple sense reflection, the Lockean subject never coincides with itself, caught as it is in a sequence of epistemic tail chasing Locke, I; Zahavi, Such tail chasing, moreover, entails an infinite regress of selves themselves never self-aware.

2 of 3 Being & Time Lecture - Martin Heidegger

Still, even those who accept its legitimacy disagree about how best to explain the relation between levels 1 and 2 of time-consciousness see Zahavi, ; Brough According to Heidegger, the essence of absolute time-constituting consciousness amounted to a subject divorced and isolated from the world because Husserl construed absolute consciousness as a theory only about the a priori, presuppositionless and essential structures of consciousness that made possible the unified perception of an object occurring in successive moments. Instead, we must understand the human being as being-in-the-world, Dasein , literally there-being; we only can understand what the world contributes to us and what we contribute to the world if we consider each as co-dependent without reducing one to the other.

For Heidegger, Dasein is being in the world, a being with goals and projects toward which it comports itself or toward which it stretches out. The projects toward which it stretches itself makes Dasein fundamentally futural in its intentional directedness toward the world. Having failed to investigate the practical comportment of the subject, Heidegger argues, Husserl's view of consciousness seems to reduce all awareness to awareness of an object in the present, thus reducing the past to the present and consciousness' self-awareness to an object among objects Dahlstron Or, better, Heidegger concluded that the performance of the reduction adulterates the view of the subject and thus should be abandoned.

Hence, one might claim, Heidegger introduces the movement of existential phenomenology, a development in phenomenology concerned with the very existence of the human being, which we have seen is termed Dasein by Heidegger. Dasein is neither fully determined nor uninhibitedly free BT She exists in the mode of her possibilities and her possibilities are motivated by environmental influences, her skills and interests, etc. Blattner, Dasein , for Heidegger, is thus a being concerned about her being, reckoning with the world through her activities and commitments.

  • Sturmgeschutz Its Variants:.
  • Mechanical Engineering, 2nd Edition: BTEC National Engineering Specialist Units.
  • The Forgotten Man (Elvis Cole Novels).

Heideggerian phenomenology thus begins from an interest in how the world appears to a being that cares about its existence, an intentional being but one who, in intending the world, is primarily practical and secondarily contemplative. That Dasein projects itself in the world implies something fundamental about it. Dasein finds itself thrown into a world historical circumstance and projects itself in that world.

These conditions suggest to Heidegger that the essential mode of being in the world for Dasein is a temporal one. Of the three temporal dimensions characterizing Dasein, we may say: First, the fact that Dasein finds herself thrown into a world and characterized by certain dispositions, etc.

The fundamental characteristic of the being that cares about its being, Dasein , then, is temporality. But things are not as simple or common-sense as they seem thus far. Time resembles Dasein insofar as time projects itself or stands outside itself in its future and past without losing itself—time and Dasein thus appear ontologically similar, or similar in their ontological structure.

The hierarchical structure envisioned by Heidegger looks like this: World-time grounds ordinary-time, and both in turn are grounded by originary-time. His position depends on a distinction between how time shows itself to Dasein as world-time and ordinary-time, the latter being derivative of the former. World-time denotes the manner in which the world appears as significant to Dasein in its everyday reckoning with the world at a practical level through its projects. For example, the world appears to an academic with certain significances or importance. Objects like chalk, books, computers, and libraries all manifest themselves with a particular value, and time does, as well just consider the fact that the new year begins in late August rather than the first day of January.

When I sit in my office, the approaching time of three in the afternoon does not appear merely as an indifferent hour on the clock. Rather, it appears to me as the time when, according to my project, I must head to class—just as it may appear to a postal work as the time when she should return to the station from her route. For me, the time-span of my class does not merely appear as seventy-five successive minutes.

If my class begins to go poorly, however, I may become self-conscious about how well I meet the demands of my project as a teacher. When the focus of my attention shifts from my project to my failures, the time of my project ceases to be my primary focus. Perhaps in this case I shift my focus to the passing nows or seconds of each increasingly long minute.