The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britains Rush to War, 1914

The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain's Rush to War, 1914
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    • Astonishingly, David Lloyd George who, had he stuck with his initial support for neutrality, could have fulfilled that role is given less attention here than a minor player like Beauchamp. He almost disappears under a cloak of invisibility, yet he was the only possible leader for the neutralists until expedience made him change sides. Neither Grey, nor any other member of the Cabinet, was eager for war, except perhaps Churchill, who, unhealthily excited at the prospect, did his bit to hasten it by his orders to the fleet.

    No one, including Grey, who seems to have believed that war would be a largely naval affair for Britain, could see the horrors that lay ahead. Get a month's unlimited access to THE content online. Just register and complete your career summary. Registration is free and only takes a moment. Once registered you can read a total of 3 articles each month, plus:. Already registered or a current subscriber? Sign in now. Lennard Davis wonders whether activist academics have wrongly prioritised exuberantly bad behaviour over the hard graft of working for real change.

    Proposed new law not as tough as some feared — but critics argue focus on Dutch ignores benefits of studying in English. Book of the week: Lara Douds applauds a brilliant dissection of Western prejudices about the Russians. John Morgan speaks to her about making a difference locally and the lost tradition of extramural university teaching. Skip to main content. Purdue extols a powerful contribution to the debate over the decision for war. August 21, Share on twitter Share on facebook Share on linkedin Share on whatsapp Share on mail.

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    Douglas Newton's The Darkest Days is a timely and important is the author of The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in , published by Penguin. To order The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain's Rush to War. The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain's Rush to War, [Douglas Newton] on giuliettasprint.konfer.eu *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The centenary of the.

    Rudy considers the huge expenses of doing scholarly work in her field of art history. All her leaders wanted diplomatic mediation to resolve the crisis. But Germany would not have it. Luckily Britain had long prepared against the possibility of German aggression and so she clung to her Ententes with France and Russia. Britain went to war for high moral purposes - essentially to protect Belgium.

    The process of choosing war shows how a robust parliamentary democracy made the difficult decision to face down German militarism. Happily, the British people were practically unanimous in support of the politicians' decision for war. So, they saw it through. We should all be proud. Naturally, there is a parallel tale regarding the role of Britain's dissenters that is unremittingly hostile toward them.

    According to this tale, only a contemptible rump of 'pacifists' indulged themselves in a futile advocacy of Britain's neutrality in They simply refused to look facts in the face. In a self-indulgent gesture, two Cabinet ministers resigned. If these Radicals had been successful in urging Britain's neutrality, the inevitable outcome would have been the triumph of German aggression.

    They should be ashamed. This book has sought to demonstrate that this fairy tale, parading Britain's moral superiority and scolding the Radicals' futility, is simplistic, unfair lacking in nuance, and often flatly contradicted by the documentary evidence. What really happened? The Liberal government was deeply divided over how to handle the crisis of There were significant forces at work on the Right of British politics eager for war with Germany for they believed it was a favourable moment.

    Sections of the Conservative press whirled their bull-roarers for intervention from an early date. The Liberal Cabinet's response to the crisis was cautious. Grey hoped that a policy of mediation. But in the last analysis, Britain failed to mediate effectively as a genuinely neutral power. Under pressure to show solidarity with the Entente. Britain did very little to restrain either France or Russia.

    The First World War: Global War 1914 to 1916 (2003)- Part 03 of 10

    Instead, the pro Entente interventionists in the Cabinet leapt forward to make early preparations for war that boosted the confidence of the hard-liners in Russia and France willing to risk war. When war in Eastern Europe was declared late on Sunday 1 August, Britain's leaders ceased efforts to keep Britain out of a wider war. The minority of Cabinet interventionists eventually 'jockeyed' the neutralist majority into a rushed choice for war on Sunday 2 August in the shape of a pledge of naval assistance to France. The pledge locked Britain into any war before news of the German ultimatum to Belgium.

    It very nearly wrecked the government, initially provoking four Cabinet resignations. Grey then preached debts of honour and fear of abandonment by allies - and the Cabinet clique rushed to a declaration of war. Throughout the crisis, the Cabinet's proEntente leaders were manipulative and deceptive. They made crucial decisions outside the Cabinet, which steered the neutralist majority toward war. There was no democratic decision for war.

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    On the other side of the question, the Radicals and peace activists tried hard to prevent the catastrophe. In the Liberal Party, they probably commanded the support of the majority. They argued against early military steps that would incite Russia and France. They pressed for a credible, active diplomacy of mediation - strengthened by a commitment to strict neutrality and genuinely even-handed negotiation which was not tried.

    The great bulk of the Liberal and Labour press stood solidly for this neutral diplomacy when the crisis broke, and fiercely maintained a demand for neutrality to the end. The Radicals were blindsided for the first week of the crisis, misled by assurances that Britain was avoiding all provocation and pursuing a strictly neutral diplomacy.

    She did neither. Only at the last gasp, over the weekend of August, did the forces of internationalism in Britain - Radical, Labour, pacifist and feminist come out loudly and openly, They began to rally public opinion, mounting significant demonstrations. There was deep resentment and recrimination when the decision came so rapidly to declare war on Tuesday 4 August. The speed of the crisis had defeated attempts to rouse a great public campaign, but a promising start had been made.

    Given more time, it might have grown to be formidable. But public opinion had scarcely had time to make up its mind when war was declared.

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    As the fuse ignited by the assassination at Sarajevo slowly burned, Newton argues that the ministers who were determined to support France and Russia spent late July manipulating and misleading the majority in the Cabinet who favoured neutrality. Hasty military steps had pre-empted its choices. Both moves encouraged hardliners in Russia and France to expect British support. Suppose Prince Lichnowsky had secured from Grey the guarantee he sought on Saturday, 1 August: that Britain would undertake to remain neutral if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality. Every church — and some beautiful — littered with bits of bombs and debris of broken stained glass and twisted lead ribbons — tops of tombs, heads of stone saints, all pell mell in the grass of the cemeteries … The Ypres cemetery will haunt me till I die. Simon Wood marked it as to-read Jan 15, Simone Pelizza rated it really liked it Feb 22,

    Certainly there was no overwhelming public pressure for war. And what of the Radical critique of the government's handling of the crisis? The Radicals were essentially correct when they accused the Liberal Imperialist minority of 'bouncing' the Cabinet and parliament. They were correct in denouncing the government's dishonesty in trumpeting the war as a war of necessity forced upon Britain by German action in Belgium on Tuesday 4 August. They saw that the government had determined upon war by Sunday 2 August in solidarity with France, and that Belgium came later as a gift to propagandists.

    They correctly interpreted Britain's decision for war as a triumph for Grey and the policy of the Entente. Ultimately, Grey had steered his colleagues and the nation to war, in line with his own endlessly repeated conviction that fidelity to the Entente was indispensable. For instance, way back in , Grey had expressed this, almost as a vow, to his astonished ambassador Frank Lascelles in Berlin - no 'wavering by a hair's breadth from our loyalty to the Entente'.

    Crusaders for Britain's righteous war will reject this Radical critique.

    Britain’s road to war

    They reply that those pursuing neutrality for Britain in July-August were playing into the hands of the German militarist aggressors, and ironically making war more likely. According to one long-running argument, Grey had to adopt a stance of 'apparent indecision' for fear of the Radicals. He was unable to give a clear warning to Germany, because the Radicals prevented him. The neutralists hobbled deterrence and, therefore, Britain failed to deter war.?

    The case for this is weak. First, Grey did repeatedly issue loud warnings to Germany, through Lichnowsky, who passed them on, backing them up with his own, Berlin, scene of both panic and braggadocio by turns as the crisis deepened. Second, Grey embraced the policy of 'apparent indecision' as his very own, not something forced upon him. It was after all in keeping with his long-established belief that the 'policy of the Entente' could restrain Russia and France by the very nature of its ambiguity?

    Douglas J. Newton

    Third, there was no high-profile Radical campaign for neutrality in the House of Commons that might have fortified the wild men in Berlin. Not a single question was asked, not a single speech was delivered, urging neutrality during me week beginning Monday 27 July- because Grey had pleaded successfully for silence from the Radical backbench.

    Fourth, there is no trail of evidence in the German documents that confidence in the power of British Radicals to keep Britain neutral encouraged the German militarists to risk war. A very few samples of the British press reached the Kaiser, but the opinions were in different directions. His marginal notes recorded a 'Bravo' for Radical opinion early in the crisis, but he complained later that it was having no impact upon Grey's initially cautious but increasingly hostile stance. Fifth, if one factor above others is to be detected in the German documents sustaining hope in British neutrality during the crisis, it was the Kaiser's faith in George V's consoling words to Prince Heinrich on Sunday 26 July indicating his desire for neutrality.