Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis for the United Kingdom 1957–1969
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Contents:
Aharony J, Falk H, Chan-Jane Lin Changes in ownership structure and the value of the firm: The case of mutual-to-stock converting thrift institutions Journal of Corporate Finance vol 2 no 3 pp — Agrawal A, Knoeber C R Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers an shareholders Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis vol 31 pp — Jacobides M G Can firms shape their environments to gain an architectural advantage?
Vance S C The corporate director.
- How Germany Unified and the EU Enlarged: Negotiating the Accession through Transplantation and Adaptation.
- Bibliographic Information?
- Field Hydrogeology- A Guide for Site Investigations and Report Preparation.
- Takeovers and the Theory of the Firm;
- The Butcher of Bear Creek (Sidewinders, Book 7).
Zald M N The power and functions of boards of directors: A theoretical synthesis American Journal of Sociology vol 75 no 1 pp 97 — Child J Organizational structure, environment and performance: The role of strategic choice Sociology vol 6 pp 1 — Pfeffer J Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment Administrative Science Quarterly 17 pp — Pfeffer J Size, composition, and function of hospital boards of directors: A study of organization-environment linkage Administrative Science Quarterly 18 3 pp — Allen M P The structure of interorganizational elite cooptation: Interlocking corporate directorates American Sociological Review 39 pp — Doreian P On the connectivity of social networks Journal of Mathematical Sociology vol 3 pp — Zeitlin M Corporate ownership and control: The large corporation and the capitalist class American Journal of Sociology 81 pp — Mariolis P Interlocking directorates and control of corporations: The theory of bank control Social Science Questions 56 pp — Freeman L a Centrality in social networks: A conceptual clarification Social Networks 1 pp — Burt R S Cooptive corporate actor networks: A reconsideration of interlocking directorates involving American manufacturing Administrative Science Quarterly 25 pp — Provan K G Board power and organizational effectiveness among human service agencies Academy of Management Journal no 23 pp — Radcliff R Banks and corporate lending: An analysis of the impact of the internal structure of the capitalist class on the lending behavior of banks American Sociological Review 45 pp — Boje D M, Whetten D A Effects of organizational strategies and constraints on centrality and attributions of influence in interorganizational networks Administrative Science Quarterly 26 pp — Mizruchi M Who controls whom?
An examination between management and boards of directors in large American corporations Academy of Management Review 8 pp — Mizruchi M S What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates Annual Review of Sociology 22 pp — Palmer D Broken ties: Interlocking directorates and inter-corporate coordination Administrative Science Quarterly 28 pp 40 — Task force on interlocking directorates Washington USA. Caswell J An institutional perspective on corporate control and the network of interlocking directorates Journal of Economic Issues 18 pp — Ornstein M Interlocking directorates in Canada: Inter-corporate or class alliance Administrative Science Quarterly 29 pp — Tricker R I b Editorial, corporate governance: An international review vol 2 no 1 pp 1 — 4.
Baysinger R, Butler H Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition Journal of Law, Economics and Organization vol 1 1 pp — Baysinger B, Hoskisson R E The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy Academy of Management Review 15 1 pp 72 — Charreaux G, Debrieres P Gouvernance des entreprises: Valeur actionnariale contre valeur partenariale Finance Controle Strategie vol 1 no 2 pp 57 — Charreaux G Le conseil d'administration dans les theories de la gouvernance Revue du Financier no pp 8 — Charreaux G a Variation sur le theme 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise Finance Controle Strategie vol 5 no 3 pp 5 — Charreaux G b L'actionnaire comme apporteur de ressources cognitives Revue Francaise de Gestion vol 28 no pp 77 — Waldo Boards of directors: Their changing roles, structure and information needs Quorum Books.
Richardson R J Directorship interlocks, corporate profitability Administrative Science Quarterly 32 pp — Mathile C A business owner's perspective on outside boards Family Business Review 1 3 pp — Hermalin B, Weisbach M The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance Financial Management 20 4 pp — Kesner I F Directors characteristics and committeeship: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure and gender Academy of Management Journal 30 pp 66 — Zahra S A, Stanton W The implications of board of directors composition for corporate strategy and performance International Journal of Management vol 5 no 2 pp — Zajac E J Interlocking directorates as an inter-organizational strategy: A test of critical assumptions Academy of Management Journal 31 2 pp — Nelson R E The strength of strong ties: Social networks and intergroup conflict in organizations Organization Studies 10 2 pp — Singh H, Harianto F Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden parachutes Academy of Management Journal 32 pp 7 — Technical, strategic and market uncertainty were largely borne by the prize contestants.
Profit uncertainty might have been higher, as given the many entrants and their ownership of partial property rights it was unclear whether and how the innovator could profit. Usually the prize was awarded by a government or private non-profit organisation for an innovation of public benefit, on the condition that it was placed in the public domain. The inventor of celluloid, for example, did not claim a prize because it meant giving away the intellectual property rights. Because of the ex-post character, the prize also perfectly solved adverse selection and moral hazard for its financers.
Brunt et al.
Little is actually known historically about these cash outlays, their size, their scale and how they were financed. After that, the capital can be spent. Volume 9 Issue 1 October Gedajlovic, E. Severn, A. Duane Ireland , Robert P.
A website, for example, offers firms to post their scientific problem and the award they will pay for the first working solution, with the website as guarantor to inventors. Another well-known legal-institutional mechanism was the patent. Patents reduced strategic, market and profit uncertainty by increasing imitation costs, and they made the time lag less pressing by delaying imitation. They also helped innovators to reduce the adverse selection problem as they could reveal more when they talked to external financers. Another legal-institutional institution was knowledge sharing.
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Nineteenth century shipyards, for example, sometimes agreed to offer to each other all innovations they developed MacLeod, , and in the interwar period several large knowledge-sharing arrangements were signed, such as the famous patents and processes agreement between ICI and DuPont Hannah, , p. Knowledge sharing agreements often gave access to innovations that had yet to be made at the moment of signing.
Notes : within the four categories the cash allocation mechanisms are listed in broad chronological order. For the independent research lab, the obstacles to the commissioner of the research are assessed. Internal financing, almost per definition, strongly mitigates the two transactional obstacles. From the financer's perspective, institutions mitigating all obstacles were prizes and venture capital.
Institutions mitigating fewest of the obstacles were, for innovators, independent research labs, closely followed by self-financing and prizes. The obstacles that were easiest to mitigate with some institutional solution were, for innovators, sunk costs and adverse selection, and, for financers, uncertainty. The most difficult to mitigate obstacles were, for innovators, the time lag and, for financers, the time lag, adverse selection and moral hazard.
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The fact that the time lag is the hardest to mitigate obstacle for both parties, reflects the observations of Schumpeter, Keynes and Hicks that the time lag and the roundaboutness of the production process is one of the central features of capitalism, and absent from static equilibrium models.
The time lag varied from about minus twenty to about plus twenty years. This finding is not unrelated to other work on institutions. Ostrom , for example, finds that although classical economic theory predicts that common pool resources such as fishing grounds, commons or water supply will be depleted without government intervention, communities developed many different ways to govern their common pool resources, and that in practice few were depleted. Likewise, we noticed how firms and societies in practice proved creative and resourceful in finding solutions to what in theory should be an insurmountable financing problem.
Legal-institutional instruments we reviewed included property rights per se, prizes, patents and knowledge sharing. We found that the only institution that mitigated all five obstacles for financer and innovator alike was venture capital. The most asymmetric solutions were prizes and government contracts: the former left important challenges for the innovator, while the latter mitigated few obstacles for the financer the government.
Some argue that venture capital is relatively important in the United States, Britain and Israel at least partially because the common law in those countries affords substantial legal and organisational flexibility Gilson, Previous versions benefited from comments received during presentations at the Business History Conference in Athens, Georgia, at the LSE economic history staff workshop, at the LSE Cliometrics seminar, at the LSE Accounting research seminar, at the Summer School of the European Historical Economics Society in Madrid and from students taking my innovation and its finance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries course.
The author alone, of course, is responsible for the final text and any errors of fact or interpretation that may remain. See also Lazonick on productive and market uncertainty. We group inappropriability under profit uncertainty here because it is a factor in whether a firm will be able to capture the profits of its innovation.
Arrow does not explicitly address the problems of sunk costs and the time lag. See also Arrow CPR also involve hardly any sunk costs, uncertainty, time lags, adverse selection and moral hazard. National Center for Biotechnology Information , U. Sponsored Document from. Res Policy. Author information Article notes Copyright and License information Disclaimer. Gerben Bakker: ku.
Received Nov 1; Accepted Jul Introduction A key characteristic of large high-technology firms today is that they hold enormous amounts of cash. Open in a separate window. Source: Identified from the literature; see, for example, O'Sullivan and Lerner Historical evidence The five obstacles meant that innovators needed cash, without underlying collateral, not capital. Brown Hoisting machine 1,, 0. Frank Duryea Self-propelling road carriages , 0.
Baker's car heater patent 2,, 0. Armstrong 2,, 0. Paul Allen Google Improved search technology 57,, 0. Sources: Beatty et al. Sources: Tables 4 and 5. Note : phys. Semi-public and public institutions The private institutions discussed above were embedded in other layers of semi-public and public institutions, as well as in legal-institutional instruments. Mixed Mixed 1 1 — 1 1 4 Total no. Source: See text; see Tables 4 and 5. Footnotes 1 Amounts rounded to the nearest billion. References Alic J. Managing U. Enterprise and Society. Allen R. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge: Arrow K.
Economic Welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In: Nelson R.
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press; Princeton: Innovation in large and small firms. In: Joshua Ronen, editor. Bakker G. The decline and fall of the European film industry. Sunk costs, market size and market structure, — Economic History Review.
Business History Review. Bankman J. Why start-ups? Stanford Law Review. Beatty A. Journal of Accounting and Economics. Beer J.
Coal tar dye manufacture and the origins of the Modern Industrial Research Laboratory. Bloch C.
The effects of mergers and acquisitions on the firm size distribution | SpringerLink
Economics of Innovation and New Technology. Branscomb L. Department of Commerce; Gaithersburg: Brown J. Why has the investment-cash flow sensitivity declined so sharply? Journal of Banking and Finance. Journal of Finance. Brunt L. Rediscovering risk: country banks as venture capital firms in the First Industrial Revolution.
Journal of Economic History. Inducement prizes and innovation. Journal of Industrial Economics. Buckley P.