Of States, Rights, and Social Closure: Governing Migration and Citizenship
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Contents:
Philosophies of Integration. Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan. See, Hollifield, J. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press.
See, Geddes, A. The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: Sage; Guiraudon, V.
Migration and the Externalities of European Integration. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Benhabib, S. Another Cosmopolitanism. Citizens, residents, and aliens in a changing world: Political membership in the global era. Social Research 66 3 : Soysal, Y.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. See, Eder, K. Giesen, eds. The scope of citizenship in a democratized European Union: From economic to political to social and cultural? Eder and B. Giesen, 86— Carens 1 Introduction I n this chapter I want to explore some of the ways in which our thinking about democratic citizenship ought to be affected by the movement of people across political boundaries.
My goal is to create some borders of my own. I want to map out the limits that morality sets to acceptable conceptions of democracy and citizenship when it comes to the treatment of people who have crossed political boundaries to live in a state in which they are not citizens. Justice prohibits certain kinds of policies toward immigrants and requires others, at least in any state that claims to be a democracy.
Within the borders set by these prohibitions and requirements lies a range of morally permissible policies whose merits will depend on context and on the democratic will of particular communities. I will focus on these prohibitions and constraints, but I will also try to say something in general terms about the content of this range of morally permissible alternatives.
In broad terms, I will defend the following two claims: First, although democracy presupposes a demos, membership in the demos is not something that the demos itself is morally free to grant or withhold as it chooses on the basis of its own inclinations or even of its own interests. Children of immigrants, whether born in the state to which their parents moved or only raised there for much of their youth, have a moral claim to citizenship as a matter of right.
The nationality laws of every democratic state ought to recognize that right without imposing any more restrictions or requirements on these children than it imposes on the children of those who are already citizens presumably, none at all. Furthermore, the immigrants themselves i.
Of States, Rights, and Social Closure
Carens who arrive as adults also acquire a moral claim to citizenship as time passes. As more years pass, even these modest requirements should be dropped. At no time should they be required to renounce previous citizenships to acquire a new one. Second, regardless of how much a polity seeks to promote a particular vision of citizenship e.
For the question of who should have what rights, the ideal of equal citizenship cannot provide an adequate normative framework. Some legal rights ought to be enjoyed by everyone physically present within the boundaries of the state, and most others ought to be enjoyed by anyone who lives there for an extended period. Length of residence, not legal status, is the key moral variable.
The longer the stay, the stronger the moral claim to most legal rights. In the end, relatively few legal rights may justifiably be attached exclusively to citizenship. These claims—especially the ones about the allocation of citizenship— may sound radical in comparison with conventional views of state sovereignty and democratic self-determination. They are, in some respects, a significant departure from current practice.
Nevertheless, I will argue that they are logically entailed by principles already widely acknowledged and practices already widely adopted in democratic states. Preliminaries It is often suggested that, when it comes to immigration, Europe and North America are fundamentally different because North American countries have seen themselves as countries of immigration since the arrival of European settlers a few centuries ago, while European states have populations with much deeper historical roots and, for the most part, little experience of permanent immigration until recently.
Governing Migration and Citizenship
Whatever the merits of this suggestion for explanatory and other purposes, it is dead wrong when it comes to the issues I am addressing. What fundamental justice requires, prohibits, and permits with regard to immigrants and citizenship in a democracy does not vary between Europe and North America. Indeed, it applies more widely still, but I leave that issue for another occasion. In a related vein, it is also often suggested that immigration raises a distinctive liberal paradox because of the tension it produces between the ideal of universal human rights and the ideal of democratic self-determination.
I Immigration, Democracy, and Citizenship 19 think this suggestion is not dead wrong but rather deeply misguided—for two reasons. First, there is a general tension, which Richard Wollheim called the democratic paradox, between the notion that normative legitimacy must be derived from the democratic will of the people and the notion that there are independent standards of morality that must be used to judge what the people decide to do.
This is a tension that does often arise with regard to immigration, but it also arises in every other area of democratic policy and practice as well. I know of no one who wants to embrace only one side of the tension, nor do I see why the problems it poses for determining what is right with regard to immigration are any different from the problems it poses for other issues. They are claims of membership made by people who are already present, not claims to be admitted to the territory in the first place.
I do not deny—and indeed, have argued elsewhere—that potential migrants can make demands in the name of their humanity and without any prior ties, and these demands do generate a kind of liberal paradox. Finally, a caution. It is not sensible, however, to think of immigration as the key to citizenship or democratic theory.
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Despite the impressive statistics that can be cited about the number of migrants in the world and how that has increased in recent years, the vast majority of people in almost every state are neither immigrants themselves nor the descendants of immigrants. Most people live in the state in which they were born and raised and are the descendants of citizens who were also born and raised there.
There is undoubtedly a great deal that can be said about democracy and citizenship without mentioning immigration at all. It would certainly be a mistake to take the migrant experience as a norm. But if immigration is a marginal phenomenon in some ways, it can be illuminating precisely because of its marginality. Thinking about immigrants requires us to be more careful about 20 Joseph H. Carens generalizations and to clarify the relationships among the principles used to explicate and justify democracy. The Right to Citizenship How should immigration constrain and transform the way we think about citizenship?
How has citizenship actually been constrained and transformed in practice? As I work my way through my answers to these questions, I will start first with a normative analysis and then comment upon how closely the reality corresponds to this normative ideal. I will try to draw attention to those features of the normative analysis that I think are uncontested and will only develop a positive argument for features of the analysis that I think are actually in dispute.
At first glance, suggesting that someone might have a moral right to citizenship will strike some people as fundamentally incompatible with the whole notion of democratic self-determination. In fact, however, moral constraints on the allocation of citizenship are a central element of our understanding of what democracy means in the modern world.
These moral constraints are by no means limited to the rights of migrants. There are other, even more important moral limits on the allocation of citizenship. But the constraints imposed by migration help to bring the other, taken-for-granted constraints into view. To understand how a contemporary democratic view of citizenship is morally constrained, it is helpful to contrast it with democratic citizenship in ancient Greece. In his seminal discussion on citizenship in The Politics, Aristotle says the question of who ought to be a citizen can only be answered by looking at the nature of the regime and at the circumstances in which it finds itself.
It is less often noticed that Aristotle indicates that the hereditary requirements for citizenship should be expanded or contracted in accord with the needs—primarily, the military need—of the particular polis. If there are sufficient citizens, Aristotle suggests it is probably best to restrict citizenship to those whose parents and grandparents were citizens.
Note that, for these purposes, Aristotle includes women in the ranks of citizens, even though they are excluded from the forms of political participation that he elsewhere describes as the essence of citizenship. Aristotle does not say clearly why he thinks this restriction of citizenship is desirable.
Of States, Rights, and Social Closure. Governing Migration and Citizenship. Authors: Schmidtke, Oliver, Ozcurumez, Saime. Free Preview. Request PDF on ResearchGate | Of States, Rights and Social Closure Governing Migration and Citizenship | Do nation-states act to facilitate or limit immigration.
Perhaps it is an assumption that the deeper the citizen heritage, the stronger the loyalty and commitment to the city, although ancient Greece is full of examples of people like Alcibiades and Thucydides who wind up fighting for the enemies of the city in which they Immigration, Democracy, and Citizenship 21 are citizens. Perhaps it is just that a smaller number of citizens are better, so long as there are enough, and stricter rules keep the numbers down.
If the city needs to expand the ranks of its citizens, it may relax these requirements, granting hereditary citizenship to those with a noncitizen grandparent or even with a noncitizen parent.