Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

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Although the Politburo vetoed military intervention in March, under the premise that its involvement in Afghan affairs would stabilise the domestic situation, Amin continued to implement policies following his own agenda.

Amin used the Herat Uprising to consolidate his own political position, in which he assumed Premiership on 27 th March [12] and by July he took office as Defence Minister. They preferred Taraki as he retained close relations with the Soviets and was open to their advice on the pace of reforms. Having deployed Vasiliy Safronchuk and General Ivan Pavlosky as advisors to Kabul to oversee and attempt to stabilise the political situation, Amin isolated Taraki by overthrowing pro-Taraki politicians in cabinet and retained his stance on the pace of reforms.

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This provided a critical turning point for the Soviet decision-making process and pushed the Kremlin to take firm action. With Amin as the sole ruler of Afghanistan he would continue his reforms at a radical pace, consequently proliferating domestic turmoil. As the PDPA initiated their early reforms, which sought to bring ethnic equality to rural tribes; cancel debts incurred by small farmers; and abolish bridal dowries in [16] , conservative landowners and clergymen who opposed reforms united against the government as the National Salvation Front.

PDPA rule decentralised under the autonomous rule of rebel groups and by September rebel formations were active in 25 out of 28 provinces, and controlled 17 of those provinces. Ultimately, Soviet fears that a weakened PDPA would succumb to internal subversion by these groups, and result in an Islamist Afghan regime accentuated the perceived need for intervention. These concerns heightened as the Iranian Revolution overturned the Shah and resulted in an anti-American Islamist state ruled by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Hilali argue that Islamism instigated Soviets alarm of Islamist spillover into their Central Asian Republics, which would disenfranchise Soviet rule, [22] examination of Soviet archival material suggests otherwise.

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Misgivings surrounding Soviet encirclement through external forces emerged after October as Soviet relations with Amin broke down. Once Amin overthrew Taraki, he engaged in a more balanced foreign policy whereby he engaged with America.

Ouimet rightly contends that this simply justified Soviet intervention. However, the triumph of the Iranian Revolution, and presence of American warships in the Persian Gulf and the consequent speculation over an American attack on Iran intensified threat of similar American counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan.

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American encroachment — like Islamism — would geopolitically isolate the Soviet Union and would also foster a situation in which the American missiles would point up at the USSR as experienced with Turkey in the s. The Soviets calculated that by invading Afghanistan, they could safeguard their border from American encroachment and depose Amin to stabilise the deteriorating domestic situation in the country. However, Islamism and Western Encroachment alone did not compel the Politburo to pursue action.

KGB officers on the ground in Afghanistan heightened the perceived security threat that these two factors posed to the Soviets, thus fostering a feeling that full-scale invasion was needed. Since the s, the KGB had been active in Afghanistan, building a covert station there, making contact with local communists and becoming versed in Afghan politics. Faced with resistance from the military bureaucracy that argued against intervention, thus influencing the Politburo against invading in March, the KGB staff played on Soviet security concerns to achieve their aims.

KGB reports exaggerated the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and consistently championed that the only plausible action was intervention. The trio feared that the failure to act would instead permit the emergence of a new regime that would ultimately encircle, and confront the Soviets with a hostile power on their Southern border.

Rather, it heightened the security threat and necessitated invasion to safeguard the socialist model to protect Soviet borders from being confronted by adversaries. Brezhnev was confident to pursue intervention, as it appeared to be the only effective way the USSR could both safeguard the PDPA from increasing threats and protect their own Southern border.

Brezhnev and Carter were still negotiating SALT II throughout [49] and it could have been seen as hypocritical for the Soviets to invade Afghanistan while simultaneously discussing limiting their armaments stockpiles. While some historians claim that the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe in December pushed the Soviets intervene due to its unsettling effect on the otherwise stable European balance, the missile deployment and the Soviet decision occurred on the same day.

The Afghan War quickly settled down into a stalemate, with more than , Soviet troops controlling the cities, larger towns, and major garrisons and the mujahideen moving with relative freedom throughout the countryside.

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Soviet troops tried to crush the insurgency by various tactics, but the guerrillas generally eluded their attacks. These tactics sparked a massive flight from the countryside; by some 2. The mujahideen were fragmented politically into a handful of independent groups, and their military efforts remained uncoordinated throughout the war. The war in Afghanistan became a quagmire for what by the late s was a disintegrating Soviet Union.

The Soviets suffered some 15, dead and many more injured. Despite having failed to implement a sympathetic regime in Afghanistan, in the Soviet Union signed an accord with the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and agreed to withdraw its troops. The Soviet withdrawal was completed on February 15, , and Afghanistan returned to nonaligned status. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan : Mohammed Kakar :

Article Media. Estimated delivery business days. Format Paperback. Condition Brand New. He was continuously faced with different versions of the Afghan experience as his country went through one of the great cataclysms of its history.

Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982

We are fortunate to have his account. Kakar writes objectively about the Soviets, the Afghan government, and the Mujahideen.

It will remain a standard work on the tragic years of contemporary Afghanistan. A fascinating and absorbing analysis. Few people are more respected or better positioned to speak on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan than M. Hassan Kakar.

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