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External actors seeking to facilitate lasting peace may benefit from observing patterns of rebel leadership. Ideology and armed conflict by Leader Maynard, Jonathan. But ideology remains a relative theoretical newcomer in conflict research, and scholars lack developed microfoundations for analyzing ideologies and their effects.
Typically, existing research has primarily presented ideology as either an instrumental tool for conflict actors or a source of sincere political and normative commitments. I emphasize that ideology overlaps with other drivers of conflict such as strategic interests and group identities, show how ideologies can affect conflict behavior through four distinct mechanisms — commitment, adoption, conformity, and instrumentalization — and clarify the role of both conflict pressures and pre-existing ideological conditions in ideological change.
However, existing scholarship either does not specify the pathways through which nonviolent protests bring about democratization or conduct systematic empirical analyses demonstrating that the specified pathways are operative. This article proposes four pathways through which nonviolent anti-regime protests encourage democratic transitions, emphasizing their ability to directly conquer or indirectly coerce such transitions.
Most simply, they can conquer democratic reforms by directly overthrowing authoritarian regimes and installing democracies. They can also coerce democratic reforms through three additional pathways. Nonviolent anti-regime protests can coerce incumbent elites into democratic reforms by threatening the survival of authoritarian regimes. They also increase the likelihood of elite splits, which promote negotiated democratic reforms. Finally, they encourage leadership change within the existing authoritarian regime.
Our within-regime analyses provide robust empirical support for each pathway. We show that nonviolent anti-regime protests conquer democratic reforms by ousting autocratic regimes and replacing them with democracies. Nonviolent anti-regime protests also coerce elites into democratic reforms by threatening regime and leader survival. These findings highlight the importance of protest goals and tactics and also that nonviolent anti-regime protests have both direct and indirect effects on democratization.
Diffusion of repression in authoritarian regimes by Olar, Roman-Gabriel. However, the similarity in repressive actions during the Arab Spring or the intense collaboration in dissident disappearances between the military regimes of Latin America indicate a transnational dimension of state repression and authoritarian interdependence that has gone largely understudied.
The article develops a theory of diffusion of repression between autocracies between institutionally and experientially similar autocracies. It proposes that the high costs of repression and its uncertain effect on dissent determines autocracies to adjust their levels of repression based on information and knowledge obtained from their peers. Repression techniques and methods from other autocracies augment the decisionmaking regarding optimal levels of repression for political survival.
Then, autocracies adjust their levels of repression based on observed levels of repression in their institutional and experiential peers.
The results indicate that authoritarian regimes emulate and learn from regimes with which they share similar institutions. Surprisingly, regimes with similar dissent experience do not emulate and learn from each other. Intimidating voters with violence and mobilizing them with clientelism by Rauschenbach, Mascha; Paula, Katrin.
We do not know much, however, about who is targeted with which of these illicit electoral strategies. This article devises and tests a theoretical argument on the targeting of clientelism and intimidation across different voters. We argue that in contexts where violence can be used to influence elections, parties may choose to demobilize swing and opposition voters, which frees up resources to mobilize their likely supporters with clientelism.
While past research on this subject has either been purely theoretical or confined to single country studies, we offer a first systematic cross-national and multilevel analysis of clientelism and voter intimidation in seven African countries. We analyze which voters most fear being intimidated with violence and which get targeted with clientelistic benefits, combining new regional-level election data with Afrobarometer survey data.
In a multilevel analysis, we model the likelihood of voters being targeted with either strategy as a function of both past election results of the region they live in and their partisan status. We find that voters living in incumbent strongholds are most likely to report having being bribed in elections, whereas those living in opposition strongholds are most fearful of violent intimidation.
We further provide suggestive evidence of a difference between incumbent supporters and other voters. We find support that incumbent supporters are more likely to report being targeted with clientelism, and mixed support for the idea that they are less fearful of intimidation. Our findings allow us to define potential hot spots of intimidation. They also provide an explanation for why parties in young democracies concentrate more positive inducements on their own supporters than the swing voter model of campaigning would lead us to expect.
September 27, The Nazis decided to expand Auschwitz and build the Majdanek camp. The fauna of perpetuations Alsatian on Ecological possible and human effects of three characters in Northern England. Next page. You have carried out the unification of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian and Baltic peoples with steely firmness. June 24, The Wehrmacht and the SS agreed on rules for the selection and execution of Soviet prisoners of war Krausnick, ; Klein, To rent this content from Deepdyve, please click the button. These laws served to define the Jews as a targeted category.
Accidental rivals? Resource allocation choices — both to and within defense budgets — are grand strategic choices, and membership in alliances and security communities affects how states make those choices. International security and political economy scholarship offers plausible explanations for transatlantic imbalances in military expenditures. However, NATO allies and EU member-states have pledged to one another not just to spend more on defense, but to allocate more defense resources to equipment modernization.
Current scholarship does not fully explain the sources of such within-budget choices, which would help anticipate the likelihood of such pledges succeeding. Building on work by security scholars, defense and political economists, and scholars of interorganizational relations, I argue that stringent fiscal rules dampen the kind of defense spending NATO and EU strategists seek. Governments respond to increasingly stringent fiscal rules by reducing overall defense expenditures, while at the same time shifting existing defense resources to personnel, and away from equipment and operational expenditures.
I find evidence in support of this argument by using education levels in the states in question as instruments for fiscal rules. A growing literature explores the causes and consequences of electoral contention and violence, but researchers lack comprehensive, disaggregated data establishing a substantive link between elections and violence.
The Electoral Contention and Violence ECAV dataset conceptualizes electoral contention as nonviolent or violent events of contestation by state or non-state actors related to national elections. The data contain more than 18, events of election-related contention covering countries holding competitive national elections between and We then compare ECAV to other datasets on electoral contention.
Cross-national and subnational analyses of electoral competition and violence show that the data are useful for assessing the global and subnational implications of existing theories.
ECAV addresses current data limitations by focusing on election-related contention, by using clear criteria to determine whether events are election-related, and by identifying the timing, geocoded location, and actors involved. In moving away from nominal categorical boundaries that produce such selection biases and looking to a more generalized conception of resistance organizations, I constructed an original dataset that aims to bridge the gap between conflict literatures. The dataset documents organizational attributes, allies, and adversaries at annual intervals organization-years , making reliable time-series analyses possible.
A preliminary data analysis demonstrates that differences in organizational political capacity explain variation in resistance outcomes generally and in particular contexts such as civil war, terrorism, and nonviolent revolutions.
REVMOD provides a unique opportunity to develop a new research paradigm for resistance studies that employs large-N empirical analyses to uncover generalities between different forms of political contention in the contemporary era, as well as to better understand why and how distinct resistance processes may produce specific outcomes. Journal of Slavic Military Studies Volume 32, no. The article frames the evolution of the narrative in the context of political and social changes to examine how deeply such changes affected the narrative.
The results demonstrate that changes in external conditions projected remarkably into the evolution of the narrative. However, the key message of the Munich Myth — the message of Czech smallness, which determined not only defeatism in this particular case but also general passivity in IR — endured, basically intact, for 70 years.
In , Tsar Nicholas I ordered a raid in the depth of the mountains controlled by rebels led by imam Shamil. However, the expedition ended in a spectacular failure, because its planners ignored the challenges of mountain warfare. In the opinion of many historians, Soviet intelligence at this time played a most important role in the planning of combat operations.
Three principal problems are examined on the basis of materials in recently declassified Soviet documents. Heroes or Perpetrators? At the center of the research are the biographies of former collaborators who took part in Nazi crimes and then, after the liberation of Soviet-occupied territories, were mobilized into the Red Army and subsequently performed exploits honored by awards. Information that these men were arrested by the NKVD after the war can be found in their personal files, which are not accessible to the broad public.
The state memory policy in contemporary Russia, as in the Soviet era, is aimed at emphasizing the heroism of Red Army soldiers; their criminal activities remain in the shadow of the medals they received. Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 1. Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 42, no. Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war by Sechser, Todd S. Journal of Strategic Studies, September , Vol.
Will emerging technologies such as cyber, autonomous weapons, additive manufacturing, hypersonic vehicles, and remote sensing make the world more dangerous? Or is pessimism unwarranted? In this volume, we leverage international relations scholarship, historical data, and a variety of methodological approaches to discern the future implications of new technologies for international security.
The findings suggest that new technologies can have multiple, conditional, and even contradictory effects on different aspects of strategic stability, and raise a host of important questions for future research.
How does the offense-defense balance scale? To do so we offer a general formalization of the offense-defense balance in terms of contest success functions. Simple models of ground invasions and cyberattacks that exploit software vulnerabilities suggest that, in both cases, growth in investments will favor offense when investment levels are sufficiently low and favor defense when they are sufficiently high.
We refer to this phenomenon as offensive-then-defensive scalingor OD-scaling. Such scaling effects may help us understand the security implications of applications of artificial intelligence that in essence scale up existing capabilities. When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deterrence and stability by Horowitz, Michael C.. Research and development on LAWS by major powers, middle powers and non-state actors makes exploring the consequences for the security environment a crucial task.
This article draws on classic research in security studies and examples from military history to assess the potential development and deployment of LAWS, as well as how they could influence arms races, the stability of deterrence, including strategic stability, the risk of crisis instability and wartime escalation. It focuses on these questions through the lens of two characteristics of LAWS: the potential for increased operational speed and the potential for decreased human control over battlefield choices. It also examines how these issues interact with the large uncertainty parameter associated with potential AI-based military capabilities at present, both in terms of the range of the possible and the opacity of their programming.
Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles by Williams, Heather. Other articles in this special issue identify potential risks emerging technologies pose to stability and how they are intertwined with international politics.
Is there a future for multilateral strategic arms control? This article looks ahead to explore how arms control might reduce those risks but in order to do so we must update concepts of both arms control and strategic stability.