Kants Theory of Knowledge / by H. A. Prichard

Kant's Theory of Knowledge by H. A. Prichard (2016, Paperback)

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One way to state what Ross has in mind, though this is controversial, is to say that each principle specifies a fact that counts as a moral reason for or against an act Stratton-Lake a xx, a; also KT Ross suggests another, equally plausible view, that each of the principles specifies a responsibility FE Therefore, we have responsibilities to express gratitude, to compensate for past wrongs, to promote the good, and so on. These responsibilities are what we are required to draw on to determine what we ought all things considered to do.

Is this list of responsibilities complete?

Ross intimates that this list is the best representation of the core commitments of common-sense morality RG 20; FE He is confident that we have these responsibilities. But if new circumstances can lead to the recognition of new duties, why may they not lead to the recognition that there are fewer duties than we might otherwise have supposed?

This seems to be the nub of the issue between Ross and his ideal utilitarian foes. Ideal utilitarians and others are keen to argue that Ross's view is problematic because it is not systematic enough. In Some Problems in Ethics , H. An intuitionist conception of justice [and by extension ethics] is, one might say, but half a conception' Rawls Ross is moved in part by this sort of worry.

Indeed, he has a very strong case against many of his critics, including Moore, Rashdall, and Joseph, since they adopt a form of value pluralism for similar reasons. He has a further argument against Rawls. Rawls's theory contains two principles of justice, lexically ordered. His first principle outlining a set of basic rights takes priority over his second principle outlining the correct distribution of social benefits and burdens. Rawls does not think it is ever right to violate rights in order to produce just distributions. This gets him a theory that is as systematic as his classical average utilitarian rival and more systematic than Ross's theory, but Ross can argue that Rawls achieves system at the expense of absolutism, which many acknowledge to have counterintuitive results.

But it is not clear that Ross has a lock on the best representation of common-sense morality.

It is relatively clear that most hedonistic utilitarians are reformers of common-sense morality e. These philosophers may not be moved at the level of moral foundations by claims that their view conflicts with common-sense morality.

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For their aim in part is to revise it. Ross gives hedonism short shrift because he thinks it obvious that pleasure is not the only thing that is intrinsically valuable RG 17, 99; FE He often argues that ideal utilitarianism, like hedonistic utilitarianism, can be dismissed because it is at odds with common-sense morality RG 17—19, Yet, it is far from clear that ideal utilitarianism is reformist like hedonistic or classical utilitarianism.

The better way to represent the dispute between ideal utilitarians and Ross is over which view best represents common-sense moral thinking. It is certainly the case that the main proponents of ideal utilitarianism took themselves to be aiming to best represent common-sense morality e. As Ross conducts it, the main dispute between the two revolves around the issue of whether ideal utilitarians can make sense of the obligation to keep one's promises. He employs the following example to illustrate his initial case RG 34— Suppose that by fulfilling a promise to Edward you will produce units of good for him but that by breaking the promise and doing something else that you have not promised to do you will produce units of good for James.

The ideal utilitarian view entails that it is wrong to fulfil the promise: we must benefit James. But this is not the verdict of common-sense morality. According to Ross, it takes a much greater disparity in value between the two to justify begging off on the promise RG 35; FE 77, In reply, the ideal utilitarian argues that the common-sense verdict may be captured by noting that breaking promises erodes mutual confidence and that keeping promises increases mutual confidence RG These goods and evils tip the balance in favour of keeping the promise.

But Ross thinks this a lame response. There will no doubt be cases where all the benefits of breaking the promise will outweigh though only very slightly all the costs associated with breaking it, and in this case the ideal utilitarian will have to admit that it is obligatory to break the promise RG Ross thinks that this is not the verdict of common-sense morality.

In a set of engaging essays, W. Pickard-Cambridge pressed Ross on the issue of whether ideal utilitarianism was actually as at odds with common-sense morality as Ross suggested Pickard-Cambridge a, b, c. Pickard-Cambridge first argues that there are strong direct and indirect reasons for taking promises very seriously Pickard-Cambridge b — He further argues that ideal utilitarianism accounts better for our intuitions about the following kinds of cases:.

Both Peter and Chuck assume that if by Peter is rendered unable ever to use his violin, then the promise is null and void. But the ideal utilitarian may see a weakness here and urge that she can provide an interpretation and that her interpretation and its explanation fits more easily with common-sense morality. Peter and Chuck assume what they do because no good would otherwise come from insisting on the promise being fulfilled.

Therefore the promise is null and void.

The difficulty with this reply is that to secure it Ross has to contend that the implied contract stipulates that we are to tell each other the whole truth or all of the truth, and it is not clear that this requirement is one to which the plain man subscribes. It is not obvious that when I sell you something I am required to tell you all the truths about the item for sale.

The ideal utilitarian is in a better position to explain why in the case of the miser the implied contract to tell the truth requires that one not state that one is a beggar when one is not and why it does not require us to tell all of the truth in other cases. The contract is specified this way because this produces good outcomes. This is not plausible. There is no reason to enrich an already rich person simply because of carelessness of this sort.

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But what drives this interpretation of the promise? The ideal utilitarian may argue that the reason we interpret the promise this way is that doing so promotes the good. Furthermore, the ideal utilitarian can argue that even without thinking of this interpretation of the promise we still believe that we have no or only very weak reasons to pay, and that they can offer the best explanation of this fact. They can also explain why this is as Ross notes a difficult issue to decide: there are utilitarian reasons on either side. Pickard-Cambridge further argues that ideal utilitarianism gives the best explanation of the strength of a promise b — Ross agrees that some promises are more binding than others, e.

William David Ross

He suggests that the former is stronger because of the value of what is being promised FE These responses seem to play right into the hands of the ideal utilitarian: the promise is more binding in the first case because of the greater value at stake and in the second case because the expectation and the disappointment are greater, all of which are goods of the sort that the ideal utilitarian claims we need to balance in deciding what we ought all things considered to do.

Ross has one final reply to Pickard-Cambridge, using the following example. A is dying. He entrusts his property to B , on the strength of B 's promise to give it to C. C does not know of A 's intentions or B 's promise. B 's activities will not disappoint A or C , nor will his activities negatively effect the general mutual confidence.

Suppose that D could make better use of the property than C. It follows on ideal utilitarianism that B ought to give the property to D. The version of ideal utilitarianism to which Pickard-Cambridge subscribes seems to entail that B has no reason to fulfil the promise to A.

This is a problem for the view. However, Ross's own view seems to imply revision in this case. This suggests that the rightness of the promise depends on it producing some pleasure or satisfaction for A. But since A is dead when B fulfils the promise no pleasure or satisfaction can be brought into existence for A , implying that B has no obligation by Ross's lights to fulfil the promise.

This seems to put him at odds with the plain man in other cases. Consider a death-bed promise with a different content, that A be buried with C , his wife. Suppose that this promise is not bonific. Ross will have to say that there is no reason to fulfil it. Hence, he'll have to advocate revision to common-sense morality. Perhaps he can argue that his revision is more conservative than the revisions required by ideal utilitarianism.

But this is a very thin difference, and may not be enough to give Ross the edge. Given these worries and the fact that ideal utilitarianism seems quite close to the plain man or common-sense morality in many of the other important cases, that it would entail that it is right to break the promise in the initial case above can hardly be considered a death blow. The ideal utilitarian may not be satisfied with this outcome.

Perhaps the more appropriate route for her is not to opt for revision to common-sense morality. Instead, perhaps the better strategy is to suggest that they can capture the importance of promise keeping to common-sense morality by holding that promise keeping is intrinsically valuable or at least that promise breaking is intrinsically evil Johnson , ; Ewing , ; Brennan ; Shaver The general strategy is to subsume all of Ross's non-utilitarian duties in this way.

This is a compelling response. To assess it, it is important to examine his theory of value.

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