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Teaching About Hegemony. Race, Class and Democracy in the 21st Century. Authors: Orlowski, Paul. Free Preview. Deconstructs white, middle-class. Teaching About Hegemony: Race, Class and Democracy in the 21st Century ( Explorations of Educational Purpose) [Paul Orlowski] on giuliettasprint.konfer.eu *FREE*.
Indeed, corporatists such as Ferguson and McCormick, allude to the connections between the two perspectives. What is missing, however, is any compelling account of the role of intellectuals in the American system, 27 a major advantage of Gramscian analysis. Working outside the established channels of the party machine and electoral politics, parastates favoured extending federal executive authority. But this, in the Progressive era, was the aspiration blocked by corrupt and parochial parties and legislatures, while the federal executive and a mobilisable public offered opportunities.
The interests of a weak federal state and of active parastates coalesced around opinion mobilization: the parastates would educate public opinion behind a reformist agenda at home, through a strong federal state, and the export of American values abroad. However, a more nuanced version of the concept may be more helpful to this study.
Placed in a Gramscian context, however, it becomes a more usable empirical concept that says something about the precise character of state-private networks. By so doing, the two relevant concepts move closer to a more radical interpretation of power. Gramsci located ideological, political and cultural struggle more centrally into Marxist thought, thereby elevating the role of intellectuals.
Through bargaining and building enduring coalitions that cut across class and ethno- racial cleavages, is formed the dominant concept that underlies a particular set of political and economic arrangements, a regime. As political regimes — or hegemonic projects and alliances - are made up of cross-class coalitions, they require public opinion mobilizations to convince the masses — or at least a critical proportion of them — that they have a stake in current arrangements.
Foundations have constructed domestic and international knowledge networks, both as ends in themselves and as means to their ends. Networks are a technology of power that produces significant hegemonic outcomes. For example, one of the functions of networks is to incorporate and socialise scholars through providing research funds and career-building structures such as professional societies, conferences, and journals.
Networks build careers and as individuals progress through the ranks, the structural probabilities for radically different thinking rapidly diminish. Added to this is the increasingly policy-oriented or at least utilitarian character of academic knowledge production — favoured by foundations — that scholars are structurally socialised or incentivised to conduct.
Therefore, such socialising structures tend to have politically-moderating effects on scholars, scholarship and political action. In periods of crisis, however, when old ideas appear inadequate in addressing problems, foundations incorporate critical thinkers to contribute to problem-solving. Materially and honorifically, networks are hierarchical systems. They, therefore, become important sources of symbolic capital and radiate intellectual influence. Symbolic capital, in turn, helps strengthen the influence of networks in their role as gatekeepers of ideas, bestowers of legitimacy for certain kinds of thinking, implicitly or explicitly undermining others.
This combines to produce political influence, moving network members and organisations closer to the centres of power.
Opposed to moribund empires and atheistic communism, for east coast elites America represented a new way forward for a world of peace and prosperity. Such networks bridged state-private and inside-outside divisions and show that state power with rather than over or against private elite action created the bases of American hegemony. The flows of material incentives — grants, jobs, fellowships - integral to network-building clearly played a role.
Both foundation network-building and the rise of America to globalism were also symbiotically connected to catalytic global events: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, , for example; the outbreak of the Korean War in June and the adoption of NSC; 48 Such groupings, with their varied interests, were leashed to the globalist vision that included an open trading system, full employment, anti-fascism abroad and anti-racism at home, and world peace underwritten by American power.
Specifically, there was little public acknowledgement of its continuous connections with either the Foundation or with the American state.
The Institute trained hundreds of undergraduates and dozens of graduate students for state service or academia - furthering the influence of its Realist approach. By , YIIS began a journal, World Politics , and ran one of the most prestigious programmes of postgraduate research and training in America. Cohen, Lucian Pye and William C. Asian, African, and Latin American Studies thrived as those regions became objects of American attention due to their strategic location, raw materials, market potential, or place in cold war competition. The warhawks' leaders were highly critical of America's past record in racial matters, and hoped to wean black Americans away from perceived 'indifference' to Hitlerism or active support for isolationism and communism.
It was in this area that FFF, in particular, made a significant contribution by supporting President Roosevelt' s Executive Order in banning such discrimination. It is also clear that the warhawks recognised the importance attached to domestic US race relations by the peoples of Asia and Africa, and used the opportunities offered by the War to try to promote civil rights reforms. Herein lies a key point: that the Big 3 foundations and their networks were involved in a self-conscious hegemonic project for globalism and against isolationism; their domestic activities were aimed at promoting the idea that America was dependent on, and connected to, the world and could no longer ignore world affairs.
Influencing the questions and methods of research at the heart of the British Empire meant multiplier effects across the globe. Creating international forums for discussing labour conditions, scientific papers, trade, legal norms, war debts, reparations, war, and peace, provided opportunities for US elites to promote their own positions but also to try and cooperate in advancing non-nationalist, anti-colonial, and non-communist arguments. Despite the idealistic character of the declarations of American internationalists, and of their more recent supporters, 81 this was a bid for hegemony.
They also created and reinforced habits of Anglo-American cooperation and dialogue. Their schemes are interesting as they have, since the end of the cold war, once again become fashionable.
Nevertheless, it provides an insight to what Anglo-American elites thought about the world and how they sought to act upon it. Together, they made more dense the elite international networks through which American foundation leaders sought to embed their values in the international system. The Rockefeller Foundation was internationally-oriented from its earliest days, particularly in relation to its work on illness and disease, but also its work with the American churches at home and overseas.
Whether officials, soldiers, traders, financiers, or missionaries [to these add professors, research fellows and doctoral students] these agents serve as the medium through which socialization occurs. These networks helped to create and sustain bonds of scholarly cooperation between elite American universities area studies and other programmes, the US Department of State, and strategic overseas regions.
An excellent example of such thinking, and its underlying political assumptions, is represented in a confidential memorandum to CIA director, Allen Dulles, from Max Millikan and Walt Rostow. In it, they argue that the American economy can continue to grow only if the world economy grows. Yet, they educated and socialised Americans at home for internationalism and committed money and time to fostering habits and institutions of international collaboration, a kind of counter-hegemony within the very heartlands of isolationism.
After , however, the domestic space for internationalism — ideologically and economically — was broad: no return to the s was considered possible, let alone desirable. Ideological preferences and material incentives lay in internationalism; hence the success of post efforts at a rules-based international order. The Big 3 foundations, among other newer American foundations, are at the very heart of these developments today. They are actively supporting existing international organisations and promoting new organisations more suited to global conditions, as they see them and wish them to develop.
The overall strategy remains unchanged, even as programmes and personnel change: Americanised or American-led globalisation remains the aim. It is also clear, however, that American foundations are not alone in this venture, though they remain the most significant. There has been a proliferation in the number of US foundations, the variety of grant-making activities, and total philanthropic assets.
Since the number of foundations in the U. The new foundations hold some of the enormous growth in wealth that has been created recently in the US. The terrorist attacks of September 11 , however, dealt a temporary blow to the trend, although they also focused greater attention among foundations to the global sources of domestic problems, especially the role of poverty and inequality.
Further legal reforms to simplify and incentivise international philanthropy is the subject of reform campaigns backed by the major foundation networks. The world is dense with foundations, foundation networks, and networks of networks. The American Philanthropy Initiative, Inc.
Even philanthropy-strengthening groups have access to a network of support groups such as the Council on Foundations and the European Foundation Center. The global givers are further networked with regional and national philanthropies, such as the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, and to international networks and associations, such as the World Economic Forum, which in turn, has its own global social investors programme. Slaughter has been advancing the networked power concept, in which America has the edge over other powers, since the s.
Her book, A New World Order , leadership with John Ikenberry of the, in part, Ford Foundation-funded Princeton Project on National Security PPNS, which promoted to policymakers intergovernmental networks as a means of global influence, and article in Foreign Affairs , suggests that the Obama administration will formalise a long-standing practice: state-led networks that collaborate with and mobilise elite private networks. Here, the United States has a clear and sustainable edge… The twenty-first century looks increasingly like another American century…. Powerful systems for socialising and integrating intellectual talent, they are also the producers of prestigious knowledge as well as strategic gatekeepers.
They draw people in and marginalise others. Even so, the role of crises or catalytic events is critical; it provides the impetus for policy shifts or for the allocation of even larger resources behind a particular programme. The foundations are now trying to do at the global level — a system of relatively strong states but weak international institutions and global civil society — what they successfully achieved in alliance with other social, economic and political forces within the United States over the course of the first half of the twentieth century.
At the core of their activities remains their attachment to networks, their master technology that, they claim, stands above business interest, politics, the American state, and ideology. Their fictions remain intact to this day. This article shows increasingly internationally and globally oriented groups, rooted in an American liberal vision of a seamless domestic and global order, actively constructing US hegemony, blurring the so-called state-private divide.
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