The Design Collective: An Approach to Practice

THE [204] DESIGN COLLECTIVE: building new structures

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If expressed personal normative beliefs merely reflect normative expectations, such a diagnosis becomes impossible. There have been several ways of dealing with the social desirability bias that have been proposed over the years, and some having been proven to be more effective than others. Crowne and Marlowe proposed that social desirability should be measured as a dispositional trait so that it could be controlled for in analyses.

Unfortunately their proposed measurement and similar alternatives; e. Beyond detecting and controlling for social desirability, researchers have proposed ways to actively reduce social desirability in respondents. For example, one method is to force respondents to choose between two or more equally socially desirable options e. Unfortunately, this particular method relies on the questionnaire designer to guess what choice options would be equally socially desirable to the typical respondent, which is often difficult to infer and may differ from respondent to respondent.

This particular method is problematic not only because it necessarily entails deceiving a participant which can reduce their trust in the researcher, especially if respondents see through the deception , but because it requires the researcher to bring a fake machine with them that looks convincingly like a lie detector, something that would be particularly difficult in field settings.

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Anonymity, however, is difficult to attain when dealing with practices such as child marriage in rural areas where measurements have to be administered in person. A more promising method to assess personal normative beliefs and obtain truthful answers is the so-called randomized response technique Greenberg et al.

Since anonymity is guaranteed, it is assumed that those who get heads will tell the truth. This enables the researcher to estimate the actual prevalence of supporting beliefs without needing to know the true state of an individual respondent. One might argue that a social desirability bias is less of a problem when eliciting social expectations, because people will be more ready to reveal that others are doing or approving of something socially undesirable.

This is only true to a certain extent, as people might still be reluctant to admit that their community—their in-group—is doing something undesirable in the eyes of the surveyors. We suspect that this may happen in interviews that take place in small and closely knit communities usually villages. Even if anonymity is guaranteed, subjects may feel compelled to respond in ways that put their fellow villagers in a positive light.

Coming back to crochet: How social media supports handmade design and social innovation

Yet another major problem in assessing social expectations is that they may not be accurate, in that respondents do not have an incentive to seriously guess what others really approve or disapprove of, and might be induced to project their own preferences and beliefs. Even if a randomized response technique may solve the social desirability problem in assessing truthful personal normative beliefs, we are left with the problem of accuracy in assessing social expectations.

A potential solution that should be particularly effective in both experimental and field settings is to incentivize the elicitation of empirical and normative expectations. When accurate responses hold the promise of reward i. Importantly, these incentives for accuracy provide an extra motivation to overcome social desirability and answer honestly Osband, If respondents typically want to paint their community in a good light out of social desirability motivations , monetary incentives will provide adequate reasons to overcome these motivations and respond more accurately.

Note, however, that some scholars do not find large differences Delavande et al. In what follows, we take a look at how such incentives are used in the economic experiments on fairness norms by Bicchieri and Chavez , 5. Their experiments employ a variant of the Ultimatum Game, a game often used in experimental economics. Then the responder could either accept or reject the proposal. If the responder accepts, both players receive the amounts proposed.

If the responder rejects, nobody receives anything—it is an ultimatum. The authors wanted to know whether proposers, torn between self-interest and fairness, would go for the coin flip—following the fairness norm that best serves their interests. Assessing the existence of a social norm is only the first step though.

We then have to study under which conditions a norm will be followed, i. In what follows, we discuss all these steps, from the elicitation of behavior and social expectations to the causal influence of social expectations on behavior. Now, if proposers were influenced by social norms, this would mean that their behaviors should depend on, first, their empirical expectations about the behaviors of other proposers and, second, their normative expectations about the personal normative beliefs and the punishing behaviors of the responders.

Moreover, if there is indeed a social norm, it is possible that it is sustained by false expectations and that there is pluralistic ignorance, i. Note how they incentivized the question to increase the reliability of the answers. Systematically incentivizing social-expectations questions was one of the novelties of Bicchieri and Chavez , Since we know what proposers actually chose, we can evaluate the accuracy of the empirical expectations and pay subjects for correct guesses.

Additional analyses of the data of Bicchieri and Chavez shows that empirical expectations were only partly accurate.

Summary of data on behaviors, personal normative beliefs, rejection and social expectations in Bicchieri and Chavez First the authors elicited the personal normative beliefs of responders by asking the following:. Please mark any options you believe are fair options. You are free to choose none of the options, one, or more than one option. Your answer will not affect your payment. Please guess how many Responders … have selected each of the options in the above question as fair options:.

The authors found that the choices of the proposers correlate significantly and strongly with their normative expectations. For instance, proposers were more likely to choose the coin flip the more responders they thought would deem the coin flip fair. So proposers were plausibly influenced by a social norm of fairness. They asked proposers the following questions:.

Again, the accuracy of the expectations about rejection can be tested by comparing them with actual rejecting behavior. However, the fact that behavior correlates with social expectations does not mean that a change in social expectations will necessarily cause a change in behavior. In other words, knowing that a social norm exists is just a first step: we have to know under which conditions it will be followed. Since conditional preferences are necessary to follow a norm, and preferences are conditional on social expectations, we have to check whether manipulating social expectations will cause a change in behavior.

For organizations designing programs to change harmful practices, it is useful to know whether changing social expectations will actually change behavior. Earlier, we discussed the problem of finding out the causal role of social expectations and other potential motives in the context of surveys. Now, experiments are an excellent tool to discover causal relationships, and in another experiment Bicchieri and Xiao did exactly that.

Their experiment employed a variant of the Dictator Game, another game often used in experimental economics, similar to the Ultimatum Game. Unlike in the Ultimatum Game, the receiver cannot reject the offer. Bicchieri and Xiao manipulated social expectations by giving dividers some true information about what other dividers had said or done in previous experiments with the same Dictator Game.

They then asked dividers about their expectations about the behavior and beliefs of other dividers in the present game. The question was whether information about previous games would influence present expectations and behavior. With regard to empirical expectations, some dividers were manipulated to expect fair behavior from other dividers, while other dividers were manipulated to expect selfish behavior.

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Similarly, with regard to normative expectations, some dividers were manipulated to expect others to believe that one should be fair , while other dividers were manipulated to expect others to believe that one should be selfish. Messages used in Bicchieri and Xiao to manipulate social expectations.

The Bicchieri and Xiao experiment allows one to conclude that social expectations have causal influence on fair behavior. The economic experiments discussed above should be considered as ideal tools rather than exact molds. When studying norms in the wild , experiments like the ones just discussed are likely to be problematic. Nevertheless, understanding such experiments is useful. By understanding the ideal, one can start thinking about alternatives that can achieve similar results. For example, experiments tell us that incentivizing answers about social expectations solves the accuracy problem, a tool we may use also in surveys.

Experiments also let us measure both consensus and compliance.

Socially Engaged Design Practice

If normative expectations are mutually consistent we can be reasonably sure that a social norm exists, and manipulating social expectations tells us if the norm has causal power, i. Modified surveys can tell us if normative expectations are mutually consistent, but they may not work if the goal is to measure causal efficacy. In this section, we discuss a few alternatives, like in-kind incentives and vignettes. We cannot invite fathers to the lab and ask them to make real decisions about marrying off their daughters.

The best we can do is ask them at what age they married off—or will or would marry off—their daughters. But we can still incentivize the elicitation of social expectations. For deontological reasons, organizations might be weary of using monetary incentives. However, one could reward correct answers with useful presents, like food or vouchers. If you guess correctly, you win 1 pound of dried figs.

We interviewed many men at least 40 years old with married daughters in your community, and we asked them the following question: At what age did your daughter s get married? We interviewed many men at least 40 years old with married daughters in your community, and we asked them the following question: Some girls get married before they are 18 years old.

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