Reformism and Revisionism in Africa’s Political Economy in the 1990s: The Dialectics of Adjustment
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Retrieved 3 May Buen Vivir: Today's Tomorrow Development 54 4 Electronic document. Retrieved May Retrieved 18 May The Economist. Retrieved 4 May The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 10 July The Washington Post. The authoritarian regime is becoming a naked dictatorship. The region must react". Retrieved 12 June Wall Street Journal. CBS News. Retrieved 18 March Retrieved 22 June Retrieved 22 March While indicators of income and consumption showed clear progress, the harder-to-change characteristics of structural poverty and inequality, such as the quality of housing, neighborhoods, education, and employment, remained largely unchanged.
Contemporary Latin America. Palgrave Macmillan. To critics, the appropriate label for these governments is not socialism but populism. Buddhist Christian Islamic Jewish. Adhocracy Anarchist economics Basic income Calculation in kind Commune Common ownership Cooperative ownership Decentralized planning Direct democracy Economic democracy Economic planning Equal opportunity Free association Industrial democracy Labor-time calculation Labour voucher Production for use Public ownership Social dividend Socialist mode of production Technocracy Workers' self-management Workplace democracy.
Tommaso Campanella Thomas More. Tawney E.
Bibliographic Information
Brinkerhoffand Kdibaba The second category, political economy, contains several streams. A large litera- ture addresses the nature and role of the state and the implications for participation Boye ; Callaghy ; Lemarchand ; Sahn and Sarris ; Shaw ; van de Walle Numerous authors analyze the impacts of interest groups on policy outcomes e.
Other authors look at NGOs and the private sector Bienen and Waterbury ; Bratton b and ; Shaw and at participation of civil society in the policy process Harbeson et al. Rothchild and Chazan ; Wunsch and Olowu Another stream contains authors who see participation in terms of the relative power distri- butions between the international financial institutions and individual countries Fearon ; Good ; Schoenholtz A substream of African analysts focuses on the roots of political economy in indigenous cultural patterns and prac- tices Ake ; Ayittey and ; Etounga-Manguelle ; Heilbrunn ; Tadesse Literature in this category can be characterized as emphasizing participation' s place in getting the politics of policy reform right.
The third literature category looks at the institutional and management dimensions of participation and policy reform. Major emphases here are on institutional capac- ity, both as a constraint to participation in the policy process and as an area for technical assistance Fitzgerald et al. African public admin- istration specialists constitute a sub-stream of literature in this category Balogun and Mutahaba ; Kiggundu ; Mutahaba et al.
The viewpoint here can be summed up as concentrating on linking who participates and how to get the institutions right for effective policy reform. WhatKind ofParticipation? Participation in policy analysis and design in general has been relatively restricted by both weak African policy analytic capacity and lack of demand. Numerous sources cite the low level of technical analytic skills as an important constraint to African participation in policy dialogue Commonwealth Secretariat ; Gulhati b; McCleary ; Mutahaba and Balogun ; Nunberg ; Paul ; Sutton The capacity constraint diminished during the s as a result of training and increased experience World Bank , but indigenous demand for policy analysis remains limited.
This factor is also mentioned in explaining why leaders pursued economically irrational policies in the first place. In authoritarian regimes, the conduct of independent, critical policy analysis has been discouraged, thus limiting the growth of independent analytic capacity. In- creasing indigenous demand for policy analysis is seen as one way to increase African ownership for policy reform World Bank ; Johnson and Wasty The design process is usually conducted by a small technical team and a closed circle of national actors Gulhati b.
Institutional constraints limit African technocrats' effective role in the pro- cess Gulhati a; Mutahaba and Balogun In many countries, decision- makers have seen little need to consult elements of civil society beyond symbolic, tightly managed opportunities for popular ratification of policy choices already made, although political liberalization is modifying this pattern somewhat Hyden and Bratton ; Nyang'oro and Shaw However, policy designs that build political support for reform measures are more successful than those that do not Corbo and Fischer ; White a and b.
Participation in policy design is expanding via a range of consultative mechanisms such as: national conferences Heilbrunn Sall Sources agree that participation is more likely in democratizing countries Hyden and Bratton Botswana is cited as exemplary in this regard; Molutsi and Holm , 82 note that "top officials have come to believe that government programs work better if the public can be induced to participate..
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The Government has sought to obtain popular consent for specific programs through public consultations" see also Picard ; Wiseman All the streams of literature stress participation in implementation as having the most influence on the achievement or failure of policy objectives. The recognition that, in practice, policy implementation is not simply a mechanical process of carry- ing out measures decided upon previously is in large part responsible for the blur- ring of the boundaries between the steps in the linear policy process model and its recasting in terms of an interactive, multidirectional frame Brinkerhoff ; Grindle and Thomas ; Kulibaba and Rielly ; Thomas and Grindle ; White a and c.
Participation in policy implementation can be divided into two categories: participation by implementing agents and by groups that are the target of reforms.
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Regarding the former, the literature notes the issues of capacity, civil service reform, and the need for a stronger state apparatus to implement policies even if the role of the state in economic activity is reduced Berg ; Callaghy ; Nunberg ; Silverman Regarding participation by reform targets, their impact is greater in long-haul reforms than stroke-of-pen ones Healy and Robinson ; Nelson ; Bienen and Waterbury ; CSIS Successful implementation over time highlights the importance of coalition-building among key stakeholders.
Hawkins , for example, credits the failure to build such coalitions as a major contributor to the demise of Zambia's economic reform program under Kaunda Bates and Collier ; Callaghy ; Gulhati Participation here is of two types: voice and exit Hirschman Informal voice includes: sponta- neous protests, rumor campaigns, one-on-one meetings with officials. Exit reflects such actions as: withholding support, non-participation in services or policy benefits Finsterbusch and Van Wicklin , boycotts, retreat into the informal sector MacGaffey et al.
Civil society can serve an important governance function here as an independent watchdog; this is a role for NGOs, the media, and universities see Charlick ; Fowler ; Harbeson et al. Who Participates? The participation of national government personnel is critical, since they are frequently the major actors in the policy process Evans ; Rondinelli and Mont- gomery Sources note their capacity to subvert policies, the fact that bureau- crats are often beholden to special interests Callaghy ; Johnson and Wasty , and the weak institutional structures national staff operate within see Sahn and Sarris ; Wunsch and Olowu International donor agencies are also key players, and their participation is critical to initiating reforms and determining reform targets and conditionalities Beckman ; Healey and Robinson ; Nelson The private sector is often the target of reform efforts Bienen ; Young The sector falls into two groups: formal and informal.
The former is small, urban, male, and protected by close links to state Gordon The latter is large and rural, contains many women, participates minimally in the policy process, but tends to be responsive to policy changes Gladwin ; Kulibaba a and b, Lele In many African countries the members of this group are the most powerful, and most vocal constitu- encies for economic and political reforms Bratton and van de Walle Studies of the impacts of economic stabilization and structural adjustment confirm that in many cases the middle class, which includes civil servants and students, has suf- fered greater declines in income and welfare as a result of reforms than rural residents Sahn and Sarris, ; Shaw The derailment of Zambia's adjust- ment program is a widely cited cautionary tale of the need for government to take into account the urban middle class in pushing reforms ahead Bates and Collier ; Gulhati ; Hawkins ; Kydd The participation of urban middle class interest groups in reform-minded coalitions is critical to the maintenance of government commitment to reforms, and to the ultimate success of long-haul liber- alization programs Johnston and Wasty ; Nelson ; Rothchild and Foley ; Toye NGOs are the subject of a large literature see Edwards and Hulme They are important as interest aggregators, and play a mediating role between the state and individuals Clark ; Fowler ; Shaw Though not recognized by the state, there is a significant amount of informal participation by people in a wide range of horizontal voluntary associa- tions Chazan b.
Bates' now classic study points out the fallacy of the assumption that rural Africans were largely quiescent and disengaged from policy-making due to their geographical dispersion, low socioeconomic status and the rigors of agrarian life. He argues that the extent of agrarian organization was a consequence of whether there were large farmers with a special stake in more favorable policy; whether the loyalty of larger, more militant farmers could be co-opted through selective administration of subsidies, and whether or how much heads of state and political elites derived personal income or support from rural constituencies see also Bates Similar conclusions can be drawn about other interest groups, underlining the fact that absent opportunities for formal participa- tion in the policy process, stakeholders devise their own subtle yet effective means of exerting influence on policy outcomes.
As Colboum notes, strategies of non-compliance including foot dragging, feigned ignorance, false compliance, or sabotage provide a means by which groups in civil society can "critique" policy, without drawing the wrath of the authorities see also Ela Experience with this kind of participation constitutes an important source of so- cial capital, which can be tapped for reform Amrthier ; MacGaffey et al. Putnam et al.
With political liberalization, civil groups and the media are more vocal, putting pressure on African governments for change Monga , a. Local residents, the poor, and other disenfranchised groups have very limited direct participation in reform Ela ; Mikell The configuration of who outside of government participates in policy reform is strongly influenced by the broader political system in a particular country.
Campbell, and H. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Successful implementation over time highlights the importance of coalition-building among key stakeholders. It is a conceptual paper, although it builds on a range of empirical work, particularly in the field of urban analysis, and on documentation of patterns of migration and of urban change in the two countries involved in the comparison: South Africa and the United States I focus on New York City in the one case and Johannesburg in the other because they are the cities I know blest, and the most integrated into global networks. The succeeding steps in each tangential trajectory are increasingly likely to be bent in a less exciting direction by the gravitational pull of other concerns.
The role and scope of interest groups, whether in the private sector or civil society, differ considerably under authoritarian, democratic, transitional, or collapsed systems Rothchild and Foley ; Young ; Zartman African governments in many countries are searching for ways of creating an enabling environment that fosters greater interest group participation, in both the political and economic spheres Hyden ; Rothchild How DoesParticipation TakePlace? The impetus for reform is often donor-driven. The perceived need for reform by African leadership is linked to crisis situations, where the urge to reform develops as a function of the elimination of other options Grindle and Thomas I; Krueger ; Kulibaba and Rielly ; Mosely et al.
Political liberalization in many countries, however, is accompanied by popular demand for economic liberal- ization, so it is too simple to say that reforms have been forced on Africa by donors. In fact, the actual process of negotiating and implementing reforms involves a large degree of joint initiation of proposals and counterproposals Berg , ; Brinkerhoff and Morgan ; White c. Incentives for participation are related to the classic interest-maximization prin- ciple, where the motivation to participate is a function of groups seeking to advance their interests Liddle The uncertainty and complexity of policies, though, can make identification of interests difficult Bates and Krueger, Key vari- ables, therefore, in determining incentives for participation are: a how different groups perceive the policy and its impact on them, and b how they define their interests as they relate to the policy and its impact.
A common conclusion regarding adjustment policies and governments' ability to sustain commitment to measures agreed to is that reform costs are immediate and clearly hurt key constituencies while benefits are diffuse, uncertain, and take a long time to be realized Bienen ; Johnson and Wasty ; van de WaUe Some authors suggest strate- gies for addressing this pattern of incentives. Institutional structures for participation have traditionally been dominated by the state and a coterie of privileged elites, but governments are facing new demands for accountability and transparency from vocal civil society Hyden ; Young The potential extent of broader participation is limited by policy type.
More oppor- tunities exist in long-term reforms, such as privatization Bienen and Waterbury or natural resources policy Brinkerhoff , than in what van de Walle calls "price-based policies" e. Haggard and Kaufman note that economic liberalization and consolidation policy reforms greatly expand the options for participation, in that successful outcomes depend upon the creation and mainte- nance of supportive coalitions of stakeholders.
Regarding the degree of empowerment available for participants in the reform process, popular protest is often cited Monga , a , but this is not the only mechanism for voice.
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Other options include, for example, lobbying, policy dia- logue, and media campaigns, all of which can be used to bring pressure to bear on politicians and policy-makers. While visible and vocal outbursts in opposition to specific policy effects may cause governments to seek tactical policy adjustments in the short-term Bratton and van de Walle , long-term empowerment of groups to participate in the policy-making process in liberalized systems is strongly related to their ability to translate economic demands into political ones, something that the urban middle class is better positioned to do than the rural poor Woods Bratton , 89 states that the challenge for the s is, "how can the poor majority reach the makers of public policy?
Dominant Themes in the Literature As the above overview makes clear, the participation literature is vast and rela- tively diverse. This section singles out a set of topical areas that emerge from the literature as dominant themes and issues. These are grouped into three categories. The PoliticalEconomyof the African State The state provides the principal context in which participation occurs, determin- ing the kinds of contributions that the private sector and civil society can make to policy reform and implementation.
Numerous studies have investigated the link between regime type and reform success Bates and Krueger ; Greenaway and Morrissey ; Haggard and Kaufman ; Lindenberg and Devarajan ; Sirowy and Inkeles However, they find no clear relationship between regime type and success in economic reform, although democratizing regimes offer more opportunities for par- ticipation in policy reform than do authoritarian ones Widner Policy-making in this context is limited to a closed elite circle Gulhati b , is relatively arbitrary, and lacks the rationality and empirical content characteristic of technically based policymaking Hyden This closed process creates a kind of "black market government," with parallel structures of persuasion and influence that guide economic policy, but which are neither publicly acknowledged nor formally sanctioned.
Studies by Ziegler , Pran , Smith, Combeaud and Moutout , and Smith and Glaser focus on the influence of private interests on policymakers, noting how the patterns of interlocking mutual interests create policy distortions that favor elite personal and commercial interests. Opening up the policy process is also difficult because the African state has traditionally guarded informa- tion jealously, but transparency is vital to policy debate and consensus-building for reform.
In many countries, civil society's demand-making capacity is growing, thus some increases in transparency can be expected Landell-Mills ; World Bank b. However, most studies conclude on a cautionary note regarding the prospects for significantly more participatory state-society relations.