The Impulse to Philosophise (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements)
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Contents:
If it makes sense to talk of perceptual consciousness as constituted, then prima facie candidates for constituents are phenomenological constituents and neurological constituents. On some phenomenologies, perceptual consciousness is a whole that has a subject, a noesis, and noematic content, as parts. On some materialisms, perceptual consciousness exists only because a certain brain process exists rather as some water, macroscopically described, exists because some H2O exists.
It is not plausible that perceptual consciousness should be constituted by the existence of a world, if a world is that towards which perceptual consciousness is directed, or has as contents. This is not what Honderich means because it is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness; a tenet that he thinks any plausible theory of consciousness has to observe.
Nevertheless, as an unintended entailment it is plausible.
Griffiths, A. Phillips
Consciousness of a set of objects might be ontologically nothing over and above the obtaining of those objects qua phenomenological objects. Phenomenological red is, then, the end of the story not the beginning of a story about consciousness. Neurology, then, ends in phenomenology but consciousness does not begin with phenomenology. Where, pre-theoretically, I think of my own consciousness there seems to be nothing. However, this consciousness is not nothing but no-thing-ness. What is the world which exists if and only if perceptual consciousness exists?
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (College of William and Mary) - PhilPeople
Where is it? Honderich claims: 'What it is for you to be aware of your surroundings is for, in a certain sense, there to be certain things with various properties in space and time' , p. Suppose existing in space-time is a sufficient condition for being physical; it follows that a subjective world is physical and, if there is only one actual space-time, then a subjective world is in the only actual space-time.
Nevertheless Honderich says 'Your world of perceptual consciousness is exactly not the physical world' , p. A subjective world is ' Even so, Honderich says 'No world of perceptual consciousness is identical in its contents with the perceived part of the physical world — or of course the other part' , p. Although a subjective world at a time is not identical with a perceived part of the world at that time, I take it that a perceived part of the world is a part of a subjective world. These are perceived parts of the world and parts of a subjective world so if the perceived parts of the world are not identical with a subjective world they must be identical with a part of a subjective world.
If a subjective world is not exhausted by a perceived part of the physical world, what else does it consist in? Because, like Sartre, Honderich thinks that it is 'inconsistent to speak of something as within or a part of consciousness and also hidden' , p. Redescribed as a subjective world, perceptual consciousness has only the parts it seems to have.
When he says 'what it is…is a totality of different things in space and time' , pp. This would be inconsistent with his thesis that perceived parts of physical things are parts of a subjective world and it is not clear where in space-time extra entities could be located. Suppose a is prior to b if and only if a is a necessary condition for b.
Then a may be ontologically prior to b, logically prior to b or epistemologically prior to b. Some sound argument for strong idealism would be required to show that the physical world only exists if some portion of it tied to consciousness exists. If a portion of the physical world were logically prior to the physical world then it would be contradictory to hold that the physical world could exist without that portion of it.
The claim would have to be shown to entail some contradiction, by reductio ad absurdum or similar. Prima facie there is no such contradiction, so no reason to suppose any perceived part of the physical world is logically prior to the physical world. If a portion of the physical world dependent on perceptual consciousness is epistemologically prior to the physical world then it is not possible to have knowledge of the physical world without having knowledge of that portion of it.
This entails a kind of empiricism: No knowledge of a physical world is possible unless there is knowledge of some part of it that is perceived. There could in principle be perception of part of the physical world without that perception being necessary or sufficient for knowledge of that part.
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Suppose, for example, that perceptual acquaintance with x is neither necessary nor sufficient for propositional knowledge of x. It requires some argument for empiricism to show that the perception of the physical world is necessary for knowledge of it. Suppose, on the contrary, that some being knows about the physical world by the exercise of intuitive intellect that is, has the faculty Kant says we lack but has no empirical faculties.
Honderich claims that for there to be perceptual consciousness is for a world to exist. Honderich needs to say more about the structure and content of a subjective world to show how perceptual consciousness could be explained in terms of it. Is there a causal relation running from subject to subjective world but not to the whole objective world in space-time even though to part of it? What is the phenomenology of subjective worlds?
Does a subjective world have an inside but no outside, a lived interiority but no physical exteriority? Could it then be physical? Is a subjective world uniquely tagged to an individual, or an individual at a time, or could we exchange subjective worlds, say by exchanging physical positions? A major motivation for Husserl's phenomenology paradigmatically in Ideas I is answering the question How is the world possible? He means: How can there be a world for me? Following Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason Husserl draws a distinction between transcendental idealism transzendentale Idealismus and transcendental realism transzendentale Realismus.
Transcendental realism is the thesis that the world of physical objects exists independently of the human conscious subject. Transcendental idealism can be understood in two main ways: a Essential features of the physical world are bestowed upon it by the consciousness of the subject, and b The conscious subject has to be capable of various constituting 'acts' to detect the physical world for there to 'be a world' for that subject. Reading a is strongly or ontologically idealist. Reading b is weakly or non-ontologically idealist. Reading Husserl in way a is not. Husserl himself oscillates between these positions but the less crude reading of him is b.
Honderich thinks ' He and Husserl share the insight that consciousness may be presented to itself as though it could be all there is. This is a phenomenological fact that makes solipsism thinkable. Husserl exploits this fact to draw the crucial distinction between the world of the natural attitude and the world of epoche.
The world of the natural attitude is the commonsensical world we ordinarily believe in before we engage in phenomenology. It contains physical objects and other people. It is always 'already there' in a completely taken for granted way, and the epoche is the act of putting the world of the natural attitude in brackets or parentheses. It is methodological agnosticism about the world of the natural attitude. The phenomenological agnosticism adopted by the inquirer is: p is neither believed nor disbelieved, which does not entail any denial of the existence of the external world.
It is neither believing nor disbelieving in the world of commonsense. All scientific, metaphysical and theological beliefs are suspended or 'dislocated'. Husserl thinks these are premised on the natural attitude. Husserl calls this 'the world or 'field' of transcendental subjectivity'. He thinks the objective world is an achievement of consciousness. We should not read this as ontological idealism.
He is trying to describe how the world can be a world for me. Like Sartre, Honderich maintains that it is ' Of course this view is consistent with consciousness being neurologically grounded, acts of consciousness being individuated through intended objects in the external world, and so on. Husserl means that after the epoche a conscious state's obtaining and its having a phenomenology are the same thing.
The distinction presupposes consciousness' , p. After the epoche, appearance is treated as reality. Husserl does not call this access 'introspection'. Introspection may only occur in the pre-phenomenological world of the natural attitude. There are two differences between Honderich and Husserl on intentionality.
Honderich says: 'The theories One difference is that Husserl thinks that intentionality is the essence of consciousness. Husserlian phenomenology is strongly essentialist. Husserl devotes many pages to discovering the essence of consciousness, the essence of perception, the essence of a physical object and so on. Despite the subjectivism of the epoche he is a strong realist about essences. The later existentialism of Sartre et.
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The other difference is Husserl does not think the claim that intentionality is the essence of consciousness is a theoretical claim. He thinks that the intentional stuctures of consciousness survive the epoche and may be described, read off consciousness.
Honderich says 'We would not get anything useful by…taking perceptual consciousness to consist in awareness of subjective things -representations, sense-data, or the like' , p. Husserl too does not think the world after the epoche a world of psychological impressions or sense data. The epoche is a 'phenomenological reduction' in which the world is reduced to the appearance of it. Appearances, or 'phenomena' are not mental or physical.
Husserl tries to remain agnostic about philosophical theories of perception in doing phenomenology. Each of us distinguishes two portions of what is, the portion that I am and the remainder that I am not. There can be no physicalist explanation of this distinction. The distinction obtains, so physical ism is false. This is the phenomenologically reduced subject.
It is not a strange, extra, metaphysical entity, and certainly not a Cartesian soul. One's ordinary conception of oneself as a psycho-physical whole human being with an empirical identity is suspended by the epoche. One's ordinary self-conception is part of the natural attitude. I still remain the source of a subjective point of view, not on the objective world any more, but on reduced phenomenological noematic contents.
Honderich says ' Honderich says 'The world in which my present perceptual consciousness seems to consist is surely spatial. So with time' , p. Husserl thinks there is a phenomenology of spatio-temporal relations, which may be described.
Phenomenological spatio-temporal relations are not objective spatio-temporal relations which are described scientifically. He thinks that objective science is grounded or founded phenomenologically.